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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES

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UNITED STATES SENATE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC., November 20, 1985.

TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS:

In 1984 while still a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and as Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senator John Glenn asked the Congressional Research Service to prepare a report on the counterinsurgency capabilities of the armed forces of the Philippines.

In requesting that the study be printed Senator Glenn stated, "As you are aware, the current problems in the Philippines have serious implications for our national security interests. Because I believe this study should be read by all Senators and their staffs, I ask the Committee on Foreign Relations to consider issuing this report as a Committee Print."

The study was prepared by Larry A. Niksch of the Congressional Research Service. I believe that it is a valuable contribution for Members, as well as a useful companion document to the Committee's staff study "The Situation in the Philippines," October 1984.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR,
Chairman.

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, DC., August 5, 1985.

Hon. John Glenn,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR GLENN: I am pleased to submit a CRS report, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," which you requested through your staff aide, Carl Ford. The report, prepared by Larry Niksch of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, examines in detail the growing Communist insurgency in the Philippines and the policies of the Philippine Government and Armed Forces in response to this complex challenge. The report comes at an appropriate time, given the detailed consideration Congress is giving to foreign aid to the Philippines.

Research for the study included three weeks of field research in the Philippines by Mr. Niksch. He visited several regions of active insurgency such as Mindanao and Negros and gathered a great deal of data from government officials, military commanders, and civilians.

Secretarial assistance in preparing the report was provided by Carolyn Colbert Johnson and Gregory Knight.

Mr. Ford emphasized the importance of publication of the report, and we look forward to discussing this with your staff.

Sincerely,

GILBERT GUDE,
Director.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFP—Armed Forces of the Philippines
CPP—Communist Party of the Philippines
NPA—New People's Army
NDF—National Democratic Front
PC—Philippine Constabulary
INP—Integrated National Police
CHDF—Civilian Home Defense Forces
ESF—Economic Support Funds
FMS—Foreign Military Sales Credits
KBL—New Society Party
SLT—Semi-Legal Team
KMU—May First Movement
NISA—National Intelligence and Security Authority
APC—Armored Personnel Carrier

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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The Communist insurgency in the Philippines has become a major challenge to the Philippine Government. It has grown rapidly in recent years against the background of a serious decline in popular confidence in the leadership of the authoritarian administration of President Ferdinand Marcos—a trend worsened by developments following the assassination of political opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August 1983—and the substantial real drop in popular living standards due to deteriorating Philippine economic conditions. The Communists are now able to field increasing numbers of political operatives and armed insurgents in all parts of the country, while the Philippine Government has been unable to implement a sufficiently effective counterinsurgency program.

The deteriorating situation in the Philippine has important implications for the position of the United States in East Asia and the Western Pacific. It could affect the future stability of U.S. base rights to Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base—military installations that represent the strategic linchpin for American projection of power throughout much of Asia. The emergence of a radical, anti-U.S. regime in the Philippines could threaten the unity and pro-Western policies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Soviet Union could be expected to seek advantage from such a development and likely would increase further its military presence in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Congressional decisions regarding aid to the Philippine Government, especially military aid to assist in dealing with the Communist insurgency, will have a crucial impact on three aspects of U.S. policy toward the Philippines: (1) the nature and degree of pressure the United States places on the Philippine Government to institute reforms; (2) U.S. relations with the non-Communist Filipino political opposition; and (3) the ability of the United States to help the Philippine Armed Forces reduce shortages of material resources and redress other problems that grow out of the inadequacy of resources.

In particular, Congress faces a dilemma in deciding whether to increase U.S. military assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces for use against the increasingly powerful insurgents, or to restrict such aid because it is judged that the aid would not be used effectively by the Marcos administration or that a congressional decision to restrict aid could serve as a useful political prod to cause the Marcos administration to reform and take more effective measures in broad competition against the insurgents. Increased aid could be interpreted by the Marcos administration and political opponents as a sign of unwavering U.S. support for the current administration and thereby reduce the Philippine Government's incentive to reform. But, if Congress were to cut back U.S. military aid, it could run the risk of cutting off supplies needed by the Phil-

ippine Government to resist the Communist guerrillas. Over the longer term, if the insurgency should result in or contribute to the loss of American base rights, Congress should expect at least that the executive branch will request several billion dollars in appropriations for the acquisition and construction of alternative base facilities in the Western Pacific and possibly the Indian Ocean. In the event that the insurgency cannot be contained by the present or successor Philippine governments, very serious choices will confront the United States between the costs and risks of direct intervention and those of standing aside.

The Insurgency

The Communist insurgency has made major gains since 1979. Armed strength is now an estimated 16,500. The Communist Party (CPP) has political organizations in an estimated 33 percent of the 41,400 *barangays* (the lowest level governmental units) in the country. CPP organizations control an estimated 12 percent of the *barangays*. The insurgency operates at various levels in nearly every one of the Philippines' 73 provinces. The CPP has expanded urban operations to a significant degree since 1982.

Six main factors appear to have contributed to the growth of the insurgency and Communist influence:

(1) The weakness of local government and law enforcement at the level of the Philippines' 1,534 towns.

(2) Worsening living standards in the towns, particularly falling real incomes, unemployment, lack of medicines and medical care, and malnutrition.

(3) The breakdown of traditional social structures and support systems in places like Mindanao and Negros.

(4) Communist organizations at the local level that are skilled in penetration, establishing links with people in the *barangays*, and convincing people that the government at various levels is responsible for their problems and worsening conditions.

(5) Military abuses of civilians, which alienate civilians from the Government and the Armed Forces.

(6) The political unpopularity of the Marcos government with key groups in the cities.

CPP strategy has three general components: party building, armed struggle, and united front building. Party building is the organizational foundation for the other two and the source of ultimate political control. CPP-controlled organizations in the *barangays* develop in stages, and when successful they eventually reach a level where they replace the legal authorities and support the formation of armed guerrilla units for the New Peoples Army (NPA), the CPP's military wing.

The NPA performs several functions: (1) the killing of town mayors, policemen, *barangay* officials and individuals who oppose the insurgents; (2) the acquisition of arms; (3) forcing the Philippine Armed Forces to abandon outposts and operations in the countryside; and (4) eventually attacking major military bases and the larger cities.

The CPP conducts its united front strategy through the National Democratic Front (NDF). The united front strategy focuses on the cities. The CPP seeks to influence politically aware segments of the urban society, place its operatives in these groups, and direct the activities of the groups toward CPP objectives. The CPP seeks to weaken the government's authority in the cities; radicalize political and sectoral groups (students, labor unions, the clergy, teachers, etc.), gain a prominent voice in the anti-Marcos political opposition, and weaken the urban economy. Besides the CPP's political activities, armed Communist units in urban areas have engaged in assassinations of government, police, and military officials.

The CPP has problems including shortage of weapons, command and control of units over wide geographical areas and separate islands, and the weak ideological commitment to communism among the rank and file insurgents. Nevertheless, the CPP has become adept at organization building and taking advantage of the numerous weaknesses and mistakes of the Philippine Government and Armed Forces.

Government Strategy

The counterinsurgency strategy of the Philippine Government is primarily military and emphasizes the establishment of security in areas where the Communists are active. It usually comes into play after the insurgency is well established in an area and has committed overt acts of violence. The strategy has three main elements:

(1) Town mayors and *barangay* captains form Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) and secure arms from the Armed Forces (AFP) for the CHDF. CHDF units often act as bodyguards for local officials.

(2) Regular AFP forces move units into trouble spots. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) normally reacts first. The Philippine Army and Marines deploy units into the worst areas. The AFP conducts operations with the goals of eliminating armed NPA units, apprehending CPP-NPA personnel and their supporters, and controlling roads and other transportation routes. (See chart on page 29 for a list of Philippine military organizations.)

(3) The AFP conducts intelligence operations at different levels. It aims to locate and apprehend CPP national and regional leaders, identify CPP cadre and supporters in the towns and rural *barangays*, and gather information on sectoral and political organizations to determine the extent of CPP/NDF influence.

Government and military officials talk about a broader counterinsurgency strategy to include dialog with civilians, civic action, and economic development. These kinds of programs occur only sporadically, however.

Problem Areas

The Government and the AFP face severe problems which they must overcome in order to defeat the insurgency:

(1) Lack of security at the grass roots: *Barangay*, town, and police officials often do not cooperate in communicating infor-

mation on insurgent activities. This is due to such factors as institutional and personal rivalries, fear of the NPA, fear of military units entering the towns, and lack of awareness of CPP activities. Police units usually are ineffective in intelligence gathering and arrest operations. Policemen are poorly trained, and they often lack transportation and communications equipment. The Marcos government has done little to improve their performance.

CHDF units receive little training, or apparently sometimes no training. Recruitment standards for the CHDF are applied unevenly. The CHDF has few resources aside from weapons. In many towns, it apparently does not function most of the time.

(2) Military-civilian relations: Relations between the AFP and civilians are strained in many regions. Civilians raise two issues: abuses and corruption. Their comments point to fundamental problems in the Constabulary: highly visible corruption and abuses such as drunken behavior of PC personnel and checkpoint shakedowns of civilians; and covert torture and execution of suspected insurgents and supporters. The Army and the intelligence agencies reportedly also are involved in torture and execution cases. Many of these incidents occur during interrogation of suspects.

Some individual units and commanders have better reputations with civilians. The Philippine Marines appear to have good relations with civilians in their operational areas.

(3) Military resources: The AFP suffers from a severe deficiency of material resources. This erodes morale and contributes to military misconduct. Commanders often have little or no transportation equipment and not enough radios to equip platoons and squads. Food and clothing are in short supply. Medical care is minimal in military bases and is generally unavailable for troops in the field. Pay allows only a subsistence existence for military families. Commanders lack the resources to conduct civic action programs for civilians.

(4) Training: With the exception of the Marines and a few individual Army units, training in the AFP is of doubtful quality. There is little standardized training in the Army and PC. There are few central training camps. Recruits often are trained with the units with which they sign up. The Army and PC conduct little retraining.

(5) The lack of non-Communist political unity: the CPP has based its recent efforts to escalate united front activities in the cities on the assumption that the Marcos government would not reach accommodations with the non-Communist political opposition groups that emerged after the Aquino assassination. So far, the CPP has been correct in this calculation. Marcos and even the most conservative elements in the opposition remain hostile toward each other. President Marcos shows little willingness to accept political reform measures. Some opposition groups cooperate with CPP front elements as a means of escalating pressure on the Government although political groups in Manila recently have distanced themselves from NDF elements. This state of affairs works to the advantage of the CPP's united front strategy in the cities.

Moves for Military Reforms?

The Government and the AFP have announced several military reform measures since late 1984. They appear to address some of the AFP's problems, but it remains to be seen whether the Government and the AFP will implement them effectively and whether the Government and the AFP will address other pertinent issues. Acting AFP Chief of Staff, General Fidel Ramos, is the architect of most of the announced measures. His future is uncertain; President Marcos has stated an intention to reinstate General Fabian Ver as Chief of Staff. Much doubt is expressed in the Philippines that Ver would institute an effective reform program.

Conclusions

The Communists at this stage are gaining strength, and the Government does not have an effective counterinsurgency strategy to reverse the trend. If U.S. aid is to help with the counterinsurgency effort, the Philippine Government and the AFP leadership will need new policies, sharply improved quality of political and military leadership, and resources adequate to solve the AFP's deficiencies. President Marcos, himself, has several options in terms of his role, including the granting of greater influence to reformist elements in his government, initiating a dialog with the political opposition, and taking into greater account the views of the U.S. Government. The Philippine military leadership will, it now appears, have to change many of the AFP's present policies in order for the AFP to become an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. The support of President Marcos or any future President will be crucial to the AFP's ability to institute changes.

Among the promising present options are:

(1) Institute intense training and retraining of AFP units and personnel.

(2) Increase AFP transportation and communications assets substantially.

(3) Develop competent local security forces.

(4) Strengthen the financial resources of local government and popular participation in it.

(5) Deal with the problem of AFP-civilian relations through a combination of measures including punishment of people responsible in the worst cases of abuse and corruption, changing some operational procedures of the intelligence agencies, instituting a program to attract insurgents and supporters to the government side, emphasizing civic action programs, and upgrading the resources of rank and file AFP personnel.

(6) Forge a unified anti-insurgency, anti-CPP front of non-Communist political groups within a framework of competitive electoral politics.

INTRODUCTION

The assassination of Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August 1983 focused American attention on deteriorating internal conditions in the Philippines. These included post-assassination political demonstrations, a decline in the health of President

Marcos, the substantial opposition showing in the May 1984 parliamentary elections, and a protracted economic crisis due to deteriorating economic conditions in the Philippines. Moreover, Communist insurgency grew to become a major threat to government control. The Philippines' problems stood in sharp contrast with the stability and steady economic growth in the other non-Communist countries of East and Southeast Asia.

Two factors perhaps best explain the seriousness of the current Philippine situation. First, the problems there are multi-faceted, involving political polarization and turmoil, economic decline, a major insurgency, and an erosion of governmental institutions. Second, current trends in each area are adverse to stability. Individual problems feed upon one another, and the result is general deterioration.[1]

The situation in the Philippines has deep implications for the United States. The Philippines is the strategic linchpin for American involvement in East and Southeast Asia as well as the Indian Ocean. This is well understood militarily because of the U.S.-operated military bases there. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base are two of the biggest military facilities operated abroad by the United States. Subic and Clark provide essential support for U.S. defense obligations in East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. If the United States lost these bases, it would have to spend upwards of $3 billion to construct new base facilities and enlarge mobile forces in the Pacific.[2]

The politicial implications for the United States may be less well understood. The Philippines is the United States' closest ally in Southeast Asia, and historical and cultural bonds extend beyond the treaty relationship. Preservation of these ties is an integral part of the American rationale for involvement in the Southeast Asian region. Philippines membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reinforces U.S. links to this regional grouping.

U.S. economic interests in the Philippines are more limited. U.S.-Philippine trade in 1983 totaled $3.8 billion, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. ASEAN as a whole has become an important region for U.S. trade, but trade with most other ASEAN countries is larger or is growing faster than trade with the Philippines. U.S. direct investment in the Philippines totaled $1.10 billion in 1983, according to the Commerce Department. Most American investment in the Philippines dates back to the pre-World War II period, and growth was relatively slow in the 1960's and 1970's.[3]

These perceived interests led the Reagan administration and Congress to take action after the Aquino assassination with the aim of influencing internal developments in the Philippines. Con-

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[1] Niksch, Larry. Philippine Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. Paper prepared for the Third U.S.-ASEAN Conference in Chiang Mai, Thailand. January 7-11, 1985.

[2] For a detailed look at the roles of the bases, see U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations. Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. See chapter on Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, pp. 134-164.

[3] See: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Economic Department Prospects and the Role of the United States. Report No. 84-171. Washington, 1984.

gressional acts included a resolution on the assassination, several hearings, and a major alteration of the military and economic aid package proposed by the Reagan administration. For FY 1985, Congress reduced Foreign Military Sales credits (FMS) from the $60 million requested by the Reagan administration to $15 million. It increased Economic Support Funds (ESF) from the requested $95 million to $140 million.[4]

The Reagan administration conducted a policy review toward the Philippines at the end of 1984 and sent State and Defense Department officials to Manila in January 1985. These officials discussed political, economic and military issues with President Ferdinand Marcos and members of his government, and they met with prominent people outside of government.

The administration also sent to Congress aid requests for FY 1986 that were greater than in the past in order to deal with deteriorating internal security and economic conditions in the Philippines. They included $50 million in grant military assistance, $50 million in FMS, $95 million in ESF, $40 million in development economic aid, and $42 million in P.L. 480 food aid. Many in Congress judged that such an increase in aid, especially military aid, sent the "wrong signal" of greater U.S. support for the Marcos administration, which, in their view, remained slow to implement political and other reforms needed to help restore stability to the country. They urged a cutback in military and until more Philippine reforms were implemented.

This paper deals with one of the major issues in the Philippines today: Communist insurgency and the role of the Philippine Government and Armed Forces in dealing with it. As part of the research, the author spent three weeks in the Philippines in January 1985 and visited several areas with insurgency problems: the central Luzon rice growing region, the northern and eastern parts of the island of Mindanao, Cebu island, and Negros island (see map p. 17). The author held meetings with and interviewed civilian and military officials, lawyers, businessmen, clergymen, and educators. He also visited a number of smaller, rural towns and talked to town mayors, town officials, and parish priests.

The report emphasizes several issues: the causes of insurgency growth; the current state of the Communist insurgency; the response and strategy of the Philippine Government; and the problem areas in the Government's response. In assessing the effectiveness of the Government's efforts and in making recommendations, the report stresses the need for substantial political as well as military reforms within the leadership of the Marcos administration as part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy.

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[4] Eduardo Lachica of the Wall Street Journal has written analyses of U.S. policy in the Asian Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1983; June 6-7, 1984, and October 10, 1984. See also Washington Post, August 17, 1984. Also: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Philippines in Turmoil: Implications for U.S. Policy [by] Marjorie Niehaus. Washington, 1984. (Issue Brief 84113.) (Continuously updated.); and Niksch, Larry A. U.S. Perceptions and Policies Toward the Philippines: Has a Transition Begun? Prepared for the Joint Seminar on United States-Philippines Relations, December 6-7, 1983.

CAUSES OF INSURGENCY GROWTH

One can distinguish in the Philippines between underlying factors within the society that provide fertile ground for instability and insurgency, and factors that more immediately set the insurgency off and fuel its spread. The interviews conducted in January indicated six key factors that are associated with the growth of the Communist insurgency. Two of these, the weakness of government at the grass roots and falling living standards, are longstanding ills of the society, though they have become worse recently and therefore have specific impact in the contemporary insurgency situation. The other four are strictly recent phenomena and act to promote insurgency growth: the breakdown of traditional social structures in Mindanao and Negros, effective Communist organization building at the local level, government military abuses, and the unpopularity of the Government in the cities. The six factors are interrelated, and no single one stands out.

(1) *The Weakness of Local Government.*—The main instruments of local government are the town and *barangay* administrations. The Philippines has 1,534 towns (municipalities below the city level) and 41,400 *barangays*. The towns are often of a surprisingly large size. Tiny dots on a road map turn out to be towns with populations of 40,000 or more. The geographical boundaries of towns often cover wide areas, including rural areas. Even provincial capitals, like Davao and Cagayan de Oro, have large numbers of *barangays* classified as rural. (See chart on page 10 to see how towns and *barangays* are integrated into the organization of the Philippine Government).

The town government is composed of an elected mayor and town council. The town governments are responsible for law and order, operating the public market (a key institution for farmers), health, sanitation, schools, and roads.

The *barangays* are the lowest and most numerous organs of government. They vary in size, but most consist of between 35 and 200 families. Extended family relationships and occupation group ties are significant factors in the social structure of individual *barangays*.

The *barangay* administration consists of a *barangay* captain and members of the *barangay* council. They have responsibility for law and order, supporting projects called for by higher levels of government, and settling disputes among *barangay* residents.

Interviews with knowledgeable Filipinos and observations from visiting towns point to several problem areas that directly or indirectly promote the growth of insurgency. The first is that the town administrative staffs and the police, housed ordinarily in a two story building generally with six to ten offices, are small in size and of poor quality. The level of management and technical training for most local government employees is low, and many hold their jobs because of political, social and/or familial connections, not technical or administrative expertise.

Second is the problem of communications and contacts. Because towns are so large in population and geography, daily contact between government and citizens is difficult as telephones, transportation facilities, and roads are inadequate.

Towns mayors can alleviate this problem through regular contacts with the *barangay* captain, members of the *barangay* council, and other leaders like parish priests and school teachers: the people at the lowest level who are best situated to be in touch with people's daily lives. Knowledgeable observers say that effective mayors emphasize these relationships. On the other hand, *barangay* officials are not officially part of the town governments, and they are not on the government payroll, thereby weakening the administration chain of command. Moreover, the quality of *barangay* leadership obviously varies, given over 41,000 *barangays* in the country. Some *barangay* officials and other community leaders may be members of rival political factions from that of mayor. (Such factions often are based on rivalry among family groupings.) Communications and cooperation in such cases therefore can be quite limited.

Meanwhile, officials from the more posperous central Luzon region to less developed Mindanao and Negros pointed to a third problem, noting that town governments lack the resources to provide needed services. They cited their financial dependence on the national government but complained that support from Manila was minimal or dwindling [5] and that Manila was unresponsive to requests for projects and resources. In short, even if town governments are aware of the problems and needs of people, their ability to help is limited.

[5] Estimates are that town governments are dependent on the national government for at least 50 percent of their finances. Towns officials in central Luzon praised U.S.-sponsored projects under the Economic Support Fund as essential, as aid from Manila diminished.

Figure 9. Organization of the Philippine Government, 1985



1/ Handle minor village-level disputes only.

Source: American University. Foreign Area Studies. Area Handbook for the Philippines. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984. p. 180.

The shrinking financial input from the national government adds to its remoteness from large areas of the country. Even before the current economic crisis, the national government's development programs emphasized the Manila area and central Luzon; other regions received much less. A report of the American Consulate in Cebu described the lack of government development programs in northern and eastern Mindanao and noted that "It is generally agreed that the greater the distance from Manila, the less the GOP (Government of the Philippines) interest in a region. . . ." [6] Major General Delfin Castro, the Commander of the Southern Command on Mindanao, cited the need for development programs on the island and lamented that "the government has no resources to push development sufficiently." [7]

(2) *Falling Living Standards.*—The decline in the Philippine economy since 1979, the economic crisis since August 1983, and the imposition of government controls in key sectors of the economy have reduced the capacity of government to finance economic development and deliver basic services, have limited the income received by agricultural producers, and have increased national poverty.[8] People in all areas visited pointed to falling living standards of the people, especially in rural areas; and many linked them to the growing appeal of the CPP-NPA.[9] Four themes were mentioned prominently in interviews: falling real incomes due to high inflation, unemployment, lack of medicines and medical care, and malnutrition. Officials and civilians in Mindanao and Negros claimed conditions had deteriorated to a point where there was a high incidence of malnutrition; malnutrition in Negros Occidental was described as acute among sugar workers and bound to worsen in 1985. Two civil officials in Mindanao asserted that the CPP was able to recruit under such conditions, especially in the towns among unemployed young men. One of these officials noted that unemployed men were the most committed of the insurgent's supporters.

(3) *The Breakdown of Traditional Social Structures.*—Increasing poverty, falling living standards, and certain national development

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[6] American Consul, Cebu. Eastern Mindanao and an Ominous Future. Department of State Airgram, April 13, 1983, p. 18-19. This report leaked to the press in August 1983.

[7] Sacerdoti, Guy. More Stick than Carrot. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 18, 1982, p. 13-15.

[8] The 1979 oil shock and the subsequent international recession hit the Philippine's especially hard. These developments pushed inflation into double digit figures and produced sharp declines in international prices for key Philippine commodity and mineral exports. The fall in commodity prices produced especially severe conditions for the nearly one-third of all Filipinos who depend on the coconut industry for their livelihood. The Philippine Government responded to the recession by increasing its foreign borrowing. The Aquino assassination in August 1983 sparked the current debt crisis, as the Philippine Government was unable to service its foreign debt. External loans ceased, as there ensued massive capital flight and the Government tried to arrange a re-schedule of foreign debt repayments with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the lending banks. The acute shortage of financing crippled both importers and export oriented businesses. The country suffered a 5.5 percent decline in GNP in 1984. The government's financial base shrunk, and the IMF demanded tough restrictions on government spending as a condition for debt rescheduling. The Government consequently was forced to curtail or delay numerous rural development programs. Overall living standards declined, as reflected in the drop in per capita GNP from $775 in 1982 and $630 in 1984, according to figures published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

[9] A public opinion poll conducted by the Development Academy of the Philippines, a government training institute, in April 1984 found that of those polled, 51 percent said the quality of their lives had deteriorated from a year earlier, and 12 percent said their lives had improved. See Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, May 14, 1984. It perhaps is this awareness as well as conditions per se that feed discontent.

policies have resulted in dislocations and the crumbling of traditional social structures in Mindanao and Negros. As peoples' livelihoods have worsened, traditional loyalties, social relationships, and patron-client ties have disintegrated. The Government has been unable or unwilling to fill the vacuum, but the Communists have keyed their efforts toward these socially displaced people.

There is convincing evidence that the CPP has found fertile ground among thousands of small farmers on Mindanao who have lost their land and social roots to large agri-businesses and logging firms. Regardless of the economic benefits of this kind of development, the impact on the dispossessed farmers often has been severe.[10] Compensation and relocation programs seem to have been implemented only sporadically, and large settlements of the displaced farmers have arisen in cities like Butuan (northeast Mindanao) and Davao. These squatters, for example, make up an estimated one third of the 100,000 people of the Agdao district of Davao;[11] Agdao is a hotbed of CPP-NPA activity. Observers in northeast Mindanao also have asserted that the Communists have gained a strong political support from people in that region by defending farmers against expropriation of their lands by logging firms and agri-businesses in his province.[12]

Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue, Constabulary Commander in Region 11, (southeastern Mindanao) gave the following commentary:

> I often question captured NPA guerrillas and ask them why they joined. They tell me that either the army killed their brothers or sisters or the government took their land.[13]

In Negros, people interviewed pictured a sugar plantation system crumbling because of falling international sugar prices, rising prices of inputs, and the policies of government agencies. As the financial position of the plantation owners has declined, the paternalistic relationship between owners and sugar workers has disintegrated. Owners no longer can provide food and other means of subsistence to the workers, whose income is among the lowest for occupational groups in the Philippines. The result, by every account, is rising malnutrition and the specter of famine among approximately 200,000 sugar workers and their families; attempts by workers to grow food on the sugar lands; and attempts by some owners to prevent this (including the hiring of private armed guards) or their abandonment of the plantations.[14] Sugar workers in the southern part of Negros Occidental province have seized some land by force.[15]

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[10] Washington Post, August 14, 1984. According to Prime Minister Ceasar Virata, 40 percent of the court cases in the Philippines deal with land disputes. many stemming from such large scale agricultural development.

[11] Washington Post, August 15, 1984.

[12] Washington Post, August 14, 1984.

[13] Chicago Tribune, November 20, 1983.

[14] According to government and church leaders, a minority of owners have set aside land for the growing of food.

[15] Asian Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1984; Business Day, January 16, 1985; Veritas, January 27, 1985.

Government officials and Catholic Church leaders interviewed in Negros emphasized that the CPP-NPA has been successful in moving into this vacuum—becoming in effect a new kind of patron for the vulnerable sugar workers. By contrast, several individuals criticized the government in Manila for alleged inaction.[16]

(4) *The Skills of the Communist Party.*—After years of trial and error, the CPP has developed effective skills in organization-building and attracting followers.

- The CPP has established supportive links with people in the towns and barangays, as traditional support mechanisms for people have eroded;
- It offers status and a new kind of group security and camaraderie to people like the unemployed and displaced, who otherwise face bleak prospects.
- It has convinced sizeable numbers of Filipinos that the governmen at various levels is responsible for their individual problems and grievances or that the government institutions will do nothing to help them.
- It apparently has persuaded many that they can act effectively against the institutions and circumstances hurting them if they join the insurgents.

(5) *Military Abuses of Civilians.*—There is widespread agreement in the Philippines that government military abuses (to be discussed in detail in Chapter V) alienate civilians and give the insurgents added support. One town mayor interviewed in central Luzon, a member of the KBL (New Society Movement), the ruling political party led by President Marcos, and on the CPP's list for assassination, emphasized that military abuses in and around his town had helped the CPP-NPA gain popular support. One U.S. official in the Philippines described such abuses as a "significant cause" of insurgency growth. A highly publicized case—the killing of seven young men in the Tungao section of Butuan city, Mindanao, in March 1984—turned residents of Tungao overwhelmingly into CPP-NPA supporters. The men had been in military custody before disappearing, and four bodies were later discovered near the military headquarters. Another case in Negros Occidental province involved the killing of nine men on election day in May 1984 in the town of Cauayan. Numerous local residents charged that the Philippine Constabulary (PC) had taken the men into custody and had marched them down several streets before the slayings took place. The Catholic Bishop of the province has accused the PC of executing them.[17]

Abuses do not figure prominently in the initial CPP penetration and organization-building in the towns and *barangays* because government military units usually move into an area only after the Communist organization is established and begins to commit overt acts. At this juncture, the abuses problem often emerges and plays into the Communists' hands. The Tungao section of Butuan city,

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[16] These individuals appealed for U.S. emergency food shipments to meet the crunch expected in April-May 1985.

[17] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in the Philippines. A Staff Report. 98th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984, p. 53-55; Warner, Denis. NPA Exploits Social, Economic and Political Injustice. Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1984, p. 6-8.

for example, had functioning CPP organizations, but the CPP reportedly had not gained support from the majority of residents until after the killings.[18]

The military's reputation has recently become so poor that the CPP has begun to use popular distaste and fear of the military as a propaganda tool to win public support and foster anti-government sentiment, even in areas where there may be no sizeable government military presence.[19] The party often does this through organizations or groups that it influences. Persons interviewed described a propaganda campaign utilizing the anti-military theme in several towns in eastern Bulacan province, central Luzon, where the CPP-NPA was active. More recently, large scale demonstrations have occurred in central Luzon, protesting "militarization." General Jaime Echeverria, Armed Forces Commander of Region 11, made the following observation:

> The Communist Party of the Philippines is apparently winning the propaganda war in the Davao region. The leftists seem to be succeeding in discrediting and weakening the Armed Forces of the Philippine by alienating the public from the military through exposure of military mistakes.[20]

(6) *The Political Unpopularity of the Marcos Government With Key Groups in the Cities.*—The growth of Communist influence in the cities is at least partially the product of the erosion of the Philippine Government's support. President Marcos' continued monopoly of political power, the declining economy, and the Aquino assassination have turned key sectors of the urban elite against the Government. These anti-regime elements include a large part of the business community, the leadership of the Catholic Church, and many middle class professionals. Students groups and certain labor unions also have adopted anti-regime positions. All of these elements have figured prominently in the mass demonstrations in Manila and other cities since the Aquino murder and in efforts to organize the political opposition. Urban elite and sectoral organizations increasingly have come into contact with CPP cadre and front groups that operate in the cities; and certain forms of anti-Marcos cooperation have emerged.

PROFILE OF THE INSURGENCY

Background

The insurgency stems from the emergence of a radical Communist movement at the University of the Philippines in Manila in the 1960's. A group of leftist students and intellectuals from middle class backgrounds proclaimed a new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968. Led by Jose Sison, they established Maoism as the doctrinal base of the party. The CPP proclaimed a "people's

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[18] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in the Philippines, p. 53-55.

[19] One town official interviewed in central Luzon stated that the people of his town feared the Constabulary because of newspaper reports of abuses, even though there had been no incidents in the town.

[20] Washington Times, May 10, 1984.

war" against the existing democratic system and vowed to eliminate "national capitalism," the "comprador bourgeoise," foreign investment, and U.S. influence in the Philippines.

Sison and his colleagues aligned with a remnant of the old Huk insurgent movement—active in the late 1940's and early 1950's—commanded by Bernabe Buscayno, known as commander Dante. Together they formed the New Peoples Army (NPA) in 1969 as the military arm of the CPP and the "main weapon" in armed revolution. The CPP later created the National Democratic Front (NDF) to influence and organize sectoral groups in the society (workers, students, the clergy, intellectuals, etc.) with the aim of coordinating the anti-government activities of these groups with party strategy.[21]

According to CPP pronouncements, armed revolution would be waged through a protracted "people's war" in the rural areas. Party leaders emphasized that the struggle could go on for years or decades. More recently, they have stressed prospects for success in a shorter period, the late 1980's and early 1990's.

CPP strategy has three main components: party building, armed struggle, and united front building. Party building is the organizational foundation for the other two components. Armed struggle and the creation of an anti-regime united front are the means of weakening the Philippine Government, causing its disintegration, and establishing a Communist regime.

CPP publications have described three stages of strategy. In the initial stage, or "strategic defensive," CPP efforts concentrate on building the party organizations, especially organizations in the *barangays*; the formation of guerrilla units; the securing and stockpiling of arms and supplies; the infiltration of non-Communist organizations; and the start of "mass actions" in the cities.

The second or "strategic stalemate" stage features an equalization of government and Communist strength. The NPA is to gain control of wide areas of the countryside, attack government forces regularly with large formations, and temporarily occupy major towns and provincial capitals. The anti-regime actions of all "national democratic" and "anti-fascist" forces are to be coordinated, and they are to become increasingly militant.

In the final "strategic offensive" stage, mass action of the anti-regime united front in the cities will become violent. The economy will begin to collapse, as productive activity dwindles. In the rural areas, the Philippine Armed Forces will be confined to major bases, where they will be subject to NPA attacks. Armed NPA units will operate in all large cities.[22]

Recent CPP statements claim that the movement has reached an advanced level of the strategic defensive stage nationwide, that the struggle on Mindanao has entered the strategic stalemate stage,

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[21] On the background of the CPP, see Lachica, Eduarado. Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. Manila, Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971, p. 171-203; Durdin, Tillman. Philippine Communism. Problems of Communism, May-June 1976, p. 40-48.; and van der Kroef, Justus M. Philippine Communist Theory and Strategy: A New Departure. Pacific Affairs, Summer 1975, p. 181-198.

[22] See the CPP's Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution in Lachica, Huk: Philippine Agrarian society in Revolt, p. 283-301.

and that the movement will pass into the strategic stalemate stage nationwide by 1987.[23]

Building a Political Base

U.S. officials now say that the CPP has political organizations in approximately 33 percent and controls 12 percent of the *barangays*.[24] U.S. officials define control as the non-functioning of permanent, legal *barangay* officials and the ability of the CPP organization to set up in the *barangays* "mass organizations" of women, youth, farmers, etc.

Filipinos interviewed in all regions visited in January 1985 testified to the spread of Communist organizations. A provincial official in Mindanao, a *barangay* captain himself, stated that the CPP has organizations in well over 40 percent of his province's *barangays* and that increasing numbers of *barangay* captains are afraid to live in their *barangays* and have moved to the provincial capital. One town mayor in the same province said that he could not visit outlying *barangays* in the town because of the CPP–NPA presence. In the Agusan provinces of Region 10 on Mindanao, local officials have described similar phenomena.[25] (See map on page 17 for Philippine regions and provinces).

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[23] Christian Science Monitor, January 2, 1985; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Situation in the Philippines, p. 37; Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 1984. Interview with Jose Sison, imprisoned founder of the CPP.

[24] Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage to the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 12, 1985. Armitage gave this estimate in response to a question. U.S. estimates have differed from those of the Philippine Government. Philippine Deputy Defense Minister Jose Crisol stated in September 1982 that of the more than 41,000 *barangays*, three percent were "Communist influenced," meaning that over 50 percent of the residents were sympathetic to the CPP and could be mobilized for mass actions; another five percent were "infiltrated," meaning that about 30 percent of the residents were sympathetic to the CPP; and ten percent were "targeted," meaning that approximately ten percent were sympathetic. Crisol's description of the three categories suggested that they all involved Communist organizations at varying levels. The statistics were similar to U.S. estimates in late 1982 and early 1983. Since then, the Philippine Government appears to have downplayed the CPP's organizational strength in the *barangays*. The Government's May 1985 "white paper" on the insurgency stated that four percent of the *barangays* had a Communist "political and military infrastructure" and that CPP armed propaganda teams "occasionally" visited another nine percent of the *barangays*. These figures give a less alarming portrayal than the earlier Crisol figures. U.S. officials point out that measuring the CPP local organizations is difficult but that U.S. figures are based partly on information from Philippine intelligence organs and do reflect a significant upward trend.

[25] Bulletin Today (Manila), February 8, 1985. Mayors at the provincial peace and order council of Agusan del Sur province stated that many officials were abandoning their towns and *barangays* because of the insurgent presence.

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PHILIPPINE REGIONS



Military officials and knowledgeable civilians in Davao City in southeastern Mindanao agreed that the CPP organizations are present or in control of many *barangays* and even whole towns in Region 11. One source said that well over 50 percent of the *barangays* in Region 11 have such organizations. Sources, too, said that many mayors and *barangay* captains no longer live at home. In Negros Occidental province, an official of a coastal town stated that "the NPA's are right in the *barangays*" of the town. On Samar, the CPP reportedly controls about one-third of the *barangays*, and its organizations reportedly contest for power in another third.[26]

CPP organization building has begun in regions even where the Government's writ is viewed as strong. Military officials interviewed on the island of Cebu stated that CPP organizers had entered Cebu province. Military officials in central Luzon have warned of Communist organization building in towns in eastern Bulacan and western Pampanga provinces and in Neuva Ecija province.[27] Individuals interviewed described several towns in western Pampanga as heavily organized by the Communists.

Organization building in the *barangays* is a painstaking process that begins with a CPP "semi-legal team" (SLT) of three to seven party members entering the *barangay* and establishing contact with a small number of *barangay* residents who have been identified as prospective converts. The *barangay* people contacted often are identified by relatives or friends from neighboring *barangays*. Once contact is made, the two groups form a *Barangay* Liaison Committee. The Committee then conducts a "social investigation" of the *barangay* to determine the composition and problems of the *barangay*. Contacts are broadened, usually through the extended family and personal alliance networks in the *barangay*. A single recruit opens the way to contact with scores of relatives and personal friends. The SLT also gains access and ties through offers to assist in family or group projects and through the provision of medicines—a common tactic.

As information is gained through the social investigation, the Liaison Committee organizes study meetings or "teach-ins." These are used to develop "political awareness" among *barangay* residents. Problems and grievances are identified, and SLT members soon assign blame, usually to government organs or perhaps certain officials or a rich landowner. Individuals interviewed in January said that the CPP in Negros Occidental is organizing teach-ins for sugar workers that focus on the hunger problem, the refusal of landowners to allow workers to grow food, and land reform that would allow workers to own the land they work.

The *Barangay* Liaison Committee next establishes "People's Organizing Groups" of youth, women, farmers, and others; these later become the "mass organizations" under party direction. Eventually, a Communist Party branch of three to five people and a *Barangay* Revolutionary Committee are established. These are composed of carefully chosen, politically "advanced" *barangay* residents. Finally, a local NPA guerrilla militia unit (usually squad or platoon-

[26] Warner, NPA Exploits Social, Economic and Political Injustices, p. 6.
[27] Metro Manila Times, December 13, 1984.

sized) and assassination squads called "sparrow units" are formed. The *Barangay* Revolutionary Committee may coexist with a co-opted legal *barangay* council or it may kill or drive out resistant barangay officials.[28]

As organization building and political awareness proceed, the party cadre often initiate what is commonly called "NPA justice." This usually consists of direct action, including assassinations against "enemies of the people" who are generally individuals people don't like. The target could be a criminal, an abusive or corrupt official, or a rich landowner. NPA action against a rustler who steals a farmer's carabao is a commonly told example. Additionally, the NPA has gained popular support by warning plantation owners on Negros not to interfere with sugar workers using land previously planted with sugar cane to grow needed foodstuffs.

"NPA justice" accomplishes three things.

- It develops ties of mutual support and obligation between the organization and the people. The organization achieves a Robin Hood image; and is commonly perceived as made up of "nice people." [29]
- It demonstrates to people that they can resort to direct action under the CPP and succeed. When an individual develops this kind of belief, he has moved a long way toward a commitment to the CPP.
- It demonstrates to people the violent consequences of opposing the CPP-NPA movement.

Four additional points should be noted. First, secrecy is emphasized as long as possible. The *Barangay* Liaison Committee quickly establishes and maintains strict security procedures. Second, the "semi-legal teams" (SLT's) usually penetrate first the *barangays* on the outer fringes of a governmental jurisdiction, usually at the edge of a town. Once they organize these *barangays*, they move into adjacent *barangays* closer to the center of the town. Third, the semi-legal teams softpedal Communist ideology and keep the role of the Communist Party hidden until the organization has reached an advanced stage.

Fourth, in areas where the CPP presence has reached an advanced stage, Communist policy toward the local populace becomes repressive. The party organization begins to tax common people like farmers and small shopkeepers. It institutes progressively tougher social controls over peoples' behavior. The definition of "enemies of the people" subject to summary execution is extended from "bad" people to include people suspected of cooperating with or being sympathetic to the Government, people who resist the

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[28] New York Times, January 10, 1985. According to the Philippine Government, over 1,000 civilians, including town mayors and *barangay* captains were killed by Communist insurgents in 1984. Washington Post, August 15, 1984. Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue, the Constabulary Commander for Region 11, disclosed a list of town mayors and barangay captains in the Davao area that the CPP had marked for assassination.

[29] The Negros town official who coexisted peacefully with the "NPA" argued that they have a good image among the people, that they had killed "bad policemen" in many towns of the province, and that they caused little trouble in his town. For published accounts of "NPA" justice, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in the Philippines, p. 38; Vokey, Richard. Assault on the Peak of Power. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1980, p. 24-28; Veritas, April 29-May 5, 1984.

social controls or who express opposition to the new organization, and government officials of all kinds.[30]

An inkling of this trend in CPP policy came from an internal document on CPP activities prepared by the security office of a business firm in Davao for the managers of the firm. This analysis, made available to the author, gave the following categorical breakdown for people killed by the NPA in Davao from January through March 1985:

Category	*Number killed by the NPA*
Individuals regarded as pro-government or indifferent, if not hostile to the insurgents (mainly women and old people)	12
Government officials	30
Suspected government informants	90

Bishop Frederico Escaler of Mindanao, a frequent critic of the Philippine Government, gave a similar portrayal of this trend in a speech of July 2, 1985. He stated that the NPA on Mindanao was forcing common people to pay "taxes" and was executing suspected government informers and local officials "just because they happen to be on the government side." [31]

Several other recent developments point to a growing pattern of murder and coercion in CPP policy. In late March 1985, an NPA unit attacked a religious group, described as anti-Communist, in the town of El Salvador in northern Mindanao. The NPA killed 20 and wounded 50. Nearly all of those killed and wounded were civilians, and a large percentage were children, women, and old people.[32] In Negros Occidental province, social workers from private agencies involved in organizing self-help projects for sugar workers claim that the NPA has begun to harass them in the southern part of the province.[33]

Since December 1984, six officials of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) have been murdered. Several of these officials were involved in union organizing in the locales where the CPP is attempting to infiltrate workers. TUCP officials and officials of the AFL-CIO's Asian-American Free Labor Institute, which supports TUCP projects, believe that the Communist were responsible for most and probably all of the killings.

Finally, the Communist Party revealed more about its ultimate intentions in a program issued by the National Democratic Front on January 1, 1985. The NDF program set the fundamental objective of the establishment of a "peoples' democratic republic." Alongside statements of support of human rights, the NDF program stated that upon the "victory" of the revolution, "a peoples' tribunal shall be created" that will "try and punish enemies of the revolution and their collaborators." The NDF program promised "severe punishment of those with grave crimes (i.e., those who owe the people blood debts) and the reeducation of those who deserve leniency." The experience of existing Communist regimes in Asia, most recently Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, suggest that such

[30] For recent indications see Christian Science Monitor, March, 26, 1985, and Metro Manila Times, December 9, 1984, for descriptions of CPP policy in Davao.
[31] AFP (Hong Kong), July 2, 1985.
[32] AFP (Hong Kong), March 28, 1985; Manila Times Journal, March 29, 1985.
[33] Business Day, June 12, 1985.

policies would involve large numbers of executions and lengthy, harsh imprisonment for thousands or tens of thousands of people undergoing "re-education." The NDF program also hinted that a "peoples' democratic republic" would impose tough ideological strictures on educators, writers, and artists.[34]

Philippine officials and others have tried to calculate the degree of popular support for or involvement with the CPP and NPA—the so-called "mass-base." Estimates of the mass base run from several hundred thousand to several million people. U.S. officials have used the figure of one million.[35]

A more specific description of the mass base came from a provincial official on Mindanao. He stated that in a typical *barangay* in his province the mass base is as high as 60 percent of the residents. Thirty percent, he said, are "active participants" who take part willingly in the activities of the party, including guerrilla units and mass organizations. Another 30 percent are sympathetic or cooperate out of fear.

Bishop Francisco Claver of Bukidnon province in central Mindanao has given a similar description. He stated in July 1983 that the NPA was entrenched in seven of his 35 parishes and that about half of the people of these parishes sympathized with the insurgents.[36]

Developing Guerrilla Units

Once the CPP has organized *barangays* in an area, it directs that main force NPA guerrilla units be formed and operate from that area, now called a base. The local militia units and the mass organizations provide the recruits and most of the supplies.

Since 1979, the armed strength of the NPA has grown sharply. U.S. officials estimate the number of armed guerrillas as 16,500.[37]

The following chart gives estimates of the Philippine and/or U.S. Governments of NPA armed strength for specific periods:

September 1972	1,000–2,000
Early 1976	1,800
Early 1979	2,000–3,000
October 1980	3,500
October 1982	6,000
June 1983	7,500
February 1984	10,000
March 1985	10,000–12,000
October 1985	16,500

There is no precise information as to the geographic distribution of NPA armed regulars, but available data suggests that one third to one half are on the island of Mindanao.[38] Other areas with sig-

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[34] Program of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines. January 1, 1985.

[35] Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage to the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 12, 1985.

[36] Asian Wall Street Journal, July 4, 1983.

[37] Washington Post, October 31, 1985.

[38] Knowledgeable Philippine sources put armed NPA strength in Mindanao at nearly 2,300 in December 1983 compared to 450 in mid-1981, thus suggesting a rapid rate of growth. Brigadier General Echeverria, Commander of Region 11, stated in April 1985 that the NPA armed strength in Region 11 was 2,400, double the number of 1984. AFP commanders give the following figures for armed strength in other regions: 2,215 for Bicol and 1,200 for Region 6 (the Western Visayas, particularly Negros Occidental province and Panay island). The Philippine Govern-

Continued

nificant armed strength appear to be Negros island (where growth is very rapid), Samar Island, the Bicol peninsula of southeastern Luzon, and Cagayan province in northeastern Luzon. The CPP claims to have armed regulars in 59 of the Philippines' 73 provinces. (See map on page 23.)

ment estimates 10,000–12,000, but the Philippine Government's "white paper" of May 1985 states that these are "regulars," of whom two-thirds are armed. U.S. officials believe a higher percentage have weapons. See: Republic of the Philippines. The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines. May 11, 1985, p. 12.

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AREAS OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

According to U.S. sources, the insurgents operate normally as platoons and squads; but the NPA command will bring several platoons and squads together for an attack on a carefully selected target. Recently on Mindanao, for example, battalion-sized (approximately 500-man) units have staged attacks. The larger units disperse into the original formations after such attacks. The NPA apparently still cannot maintain big units permanently because of problems of supply and vulnerability to attack. Crossing this threshold seems to be difficult. The CPP-NPA command reportedly abandoned company-sized (100-200 man) operations on Samar in 1979 because the organizational base could not provide adequate support.[39]

Weapons are essential for a buildup into larger units, and guerrilla attacks on military outposts have had the primary purpose of securing arms. CPP-NPA leaders have acknowledged shortages of weapons,[40] and they have launched a campaign called "*agaw-armas*" or the grabbing of arms.

The bigger unit attacks also appear to have other goals. If successful, they force the military to abandon outposts and checkpoints in the countryside. They also demonstrate insurgent "invincibility" to the populace of these regions.

Money is necessary for the development of guerrilla forces. The CPP has resorted to the extortion of money from business firms, including multinational corporations. Firms that pay are left alone; those that refuse face attack on their facilities or assassination of their officials. Businessmen interviewed in Davao and Cagayan de Oro stated that the extortion was widespread. The Communists reportedly have stepped up their demands for money in recent months as they have increased their armed strength.[41]

According to Philippine Government sources, the CPP receives money from leftist organizations in other countries, some of which is channeled through infiltrated Filipino sectoral groups. The Government also states that there is "no evidence" that the CPP receives foreign assistance from any foreign government.[42]

United Front Efforts and Urban Guerrilla Warfare

The CPP's united front strategy through the National Democratic Front also has gained momentum in the last three years. The CPP aims to use united front and urban guerrilla warfare tactics to weaken the Government's authority in the cities and weaken the urban economy. *Ang Bayan*, the CPP's official journal, stated late last year that this strategy would create a "revolutionary situation in the cities" in preparation for "popular uprisings."[43] The CPP

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[39] Sacerdoti, Guy. "Red Army" on the March. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 28, 1984, p. 40-41.

[40] Business Day (Manila), May 8, 1984. Interview with Conrado Balweg, CPP-NPA leader in northern Luzon.

[41] Washington Post, March 9, 1985; Manila Far Wast Broadcasting Company broadcast, March 22, 1985. Acting Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Fidel Ramos, recommended that the Government suspend logging operations in Cagayan province (Northeast Luzon) because of Communist "taxes" on logging firms.

[42] Times Journal (Manila), April 4, 1985. U.S. intelligence officials assert, however, that the Soviet Union has increased the size of its Embassy staff and its overall activities in the Philippines and that these apparently include stepped up contracts with CPP cadre and front organizations.

[43] Ang Bayan, December 1984.

reportedly plans such uprisings in the major cities of Mindanao within the next three years and a "new storm" of disorders in Manila at the same time."[44] The uprisings would occur in coordination with stepped up NPA attacks by main force units, including attacks on towns and provincial capitals. This corresponds with the CPP's timetable for moving the insurgency into the "strategic stalemate" phase.

In short, the CPP's united front strategy includes both political action and armed struggle. These are to be increasingly merged as the insurgency advances. In Manila and most other large cities, the CPP currently emphasizes political action. Since the Aquino assassination, CPP agents and members of front organizations have played an increasingly important role in organizing demonstrations and participating in them. CPP/NDF personnel reportedly have succeeded in infiltrating and influencing a number of the protest groups that merged after the assassination. Since the May 1984 parliamentary elections, well-organized CPP "composite units" have been in the forefront of demonstrations in Manila.[45] Also in the Manila area, the leftist May First Movement (KMU) labor organization has led a number of strikes with strong political overtones. Some workers have reported that meetings obstensibly on unionism have contained lectures on how to fight the Government guerrilla-style in the hills—the environ of the NPA.[46]

Similar CPP-directed activities reportedly have increased in the provinces with student and labor groups as priority targets. Knowledgeable sources in Davao stated in interviews that the CPP has been involved in labor strikes and demonstrations in the city. The League of Filipino Students, long identified by U.S. officials as a Communist front organization, has organized recent student demonstrations in Davao, and it has supported the strikes in Davao.[47]

The CPP has begun to merge armed operations and political operations in Davao. The CPP has deployed "armed urban partisan units" into Davao, where they have carried out numerous assassinations in the last three years. Policemen and civilian officials have been the principal targets. Nearly 50 Davao policemen were killed in 1984, according to the Constabulary Commander for Region 11.

The CPP uses these actions in Davao to erode the Government's effectiveness and image among the populace and to develop an overall climate for militant anti-government actions by the infiltrated sectoral and political groups. Like the assassinations committed by the sparrow units in the smaller towns and barangays, the CPP intends that the operations of the armed urban partisan units in the cities will set an example of direct, violent, and effective blows against the Government.

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[44] The Economist's Foreign Report, September 1984.

[45] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in the Philippines, p. 17. Knowledgeable U.S. officials have confirmed that a number of such groups are infiltrated.

[46] Asian Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1985.

[47] People's Daily Forum (Davao), July 29, 1984; Business Day, November 27, 1984. For reference on the political orientation of the League of Filipino Students, see CRS, The Internal Situation in the Philippines: Current Trends and Future Prospects, p. 90-91.

CPP cadre reportedly have stated that operations in Davao constitute a "blueprint" for assaults on other major cities by 1990.[48] Sources with contacts in the CPP have told the author that the CPP plans to begin armed urban partisan operations in Manila in 1985. The CPP has also targeted Cebu province for organization building in 1985. Cebu is more urbanized than most other provinces; and several assassinations attributed to the NPA already have occurred in Cebu City, the Philippines' second largest city.

The CPP also has said that united front activities could lead to a coalition government. The party has emphasized this theme particularly since the Aquino assassination. The theme now appears in protests and strikes where the Communists are involved as well as in propaganda grafitti that one sees in the cities and towns. Thus, the CPP seems to be positioning itself for a situation in the near future in which the Marcos government would collapse and oppositionists would assume power. It appears ready to support candidates in the 1986 local elections in order to strengthen its hold in certain locales and enhance its status within opposition ranks. CPP statements about a coalition government make two points: the CPP and front organizations would be members, and a coalition government represents an interim step toward a "socialist government." [49]

Leadership Organization

Like the original founders of the CPP, today's leaders come from middle class student backgrounds. The top leaders are people from the University of the Philippines. The schools in the Manila area continue to provide a segment of new cadre, but the CPP in some regions has recruited successfully on provincial campuses. Some CPP-NPA cadre in the Davao area, for example, come from former students at the Ateneo de Davao University. The CPP's ability to recruit local students obviously enhances the party's familiarization with local conditions and its potential appeal to local inhabitants.

A 1984 Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report outlined the insurgent organization, describing parallel CPP commissions and NPA branch commands down to the barangay level.[50] (See page 27.)

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[48] For accounts of these kinds of operations in Davao, see Baltimore Sun, February 19, 1985; Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, February 18, 1985; and Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1985.

[49] Business Day, January 23, 1985; People's Daily Forum (Davao), July 29, 1984; and Asian Wall Street Journal, July 4, 1983.

[50] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in the Philippines, p. 30–33.

CRS-44

CPP AND NPA ORGANIZATIONS



Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Situation in the Philippines, p. 32.

GOVERNMENT STRATEGY

The Philippine Government and Armed Forces (AFP) have considerable experience in combatting insurgencies. They put down the Huk movement in central Luzon in the early 1950's. They succeeded through a combination of restructuring and reform of the AFP, an upgrading of the AFP's resources, civic action programs, military operations based on small unit patrolling, intelligence work, and programs to attract Huks to the government side. This strategy, devised principally (and led) by Ramon Magsaysay, laid the foundation for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to this day.

But Philippine Government strategy is different today. It is mainly military and emphasizes the establishment of security in areas where Communists are active. The strategy usually comes into play only after the CPP-NPA commits overt acts in a town or region. Thus, it is reactive and is aimed at "keeping the lid on the pot."

Government strategy has three main elements: (1) the formation of Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) at the local level; (2) the operations of regular militarily units in insurgency regions; and (3) the operations of AFP intelligence organizations. (See chart showing structure and strength of Philippine public security and armed forces on page 29.)

CRS-46

ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ARMED FORCES



Source: Figures on strengths of individual services taken from: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1984-1985. pp. 107-108.

Formation of CHDF.—Town mayors and barangay captains react to insurgency mainly by forming Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF). These officials draw recruits from local citizens and arrange with the Philippine Constabulary (PC) or Army for arms (usually older model rifles) and training for the CHDF. Business firms also may organize CHDF-type units to protect their property.

People interviewed in several towns revealed the following pattern of CHDF formation. The town mayor will organize a unit of anywhere from 12 to 30 that will serve as his personal bodyguard. The *barangay* captains, sometimes in cooperation with the mayor, will set up a unit for each *barangay*. A *barangay* unit normally consists of 12 to 20 men. As with the town unit, a main function of the *barangay* CHDF is to protect the *barangay* captain and other *barangay* officials.

Estimates of the number of CHDF personnel in the Philippines is usually 65,000–70,000.[51] The actual number may be larger. Interviews indicated that local officials are forming CHDF throughout the country. In a number of towns visited, the percentage of *barangays* with CHDF ranged from 30 to 100 percent.

Operations of Regular Forces.—Overt CPP–NPA acts, like assassinations or attacks on police stations, draw the attention of the regular AFP. The Constabulary (PC) is usually the first to react. The PC was created in 1901 by American authorities as a national internal security force organized along military lines. It maintains that mission and thus is crucial in counterinsurgency. It is one of the four armed services (the Army, Navy, and Air Force are the other three). It numbers 43,500.[52] According to U.S. officials, it currently is organized into 225 operational companies with about 90 men per company.

PC companies are deployed in practically all 73 provinces. A provincial commander has operational control over companies in his province, although ultimate control resides in a regional PC commander for each of the Philippines 13 regions. A provincial commander normally has three PC companies. He usually keeps one at headquarters and deploys two in the field. The deployed companies operate in a similar manner, keeping one platoon at the company headquarters and sending the others on missions.

Provincial PC commanders and other individuals interviewed stated that the provincial commanders deploy their companies near towns where the CPP–NPA is most active and visible. Company commanders organize operations around and in the towns. Mission objectives are to seek out and destroy armed NPA guerrillas and sparrow units and identify and arrest CPP–NPA personnel and their supporters. Thus, the PC conducts a combination of military and police investigative operations, including questioning and interrogation of individuals.

Intensified military operations in an area occur when Army and/or Marine units move in. This reaction ordinarily occurs when NPA-instigated violence is widespread, involves large NPA units or has begun in a large town or city.[53] The basic unit of the Army

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[51] International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1984–1985, p. 108.

[52] Ibid.

[53] See the Cebu Consulate's report on the NPA's activities around San Vincente, Davao de Norte province, that resulted in the deployment of Army and PC battalions around that town.

and Marine Corps is the combat battalion. As of January 1985, the Army had 52 such battalions, and the Marine Corps has eight. Authorized strength per Army battalion is 961; but actual strength normally is about 500. A Marine battalion numbers about 275.

The AFP created the battalions during the Huk period and structured them for counterinsurgency warfare. The formal structure continues today. On paper, it emphasizes self-sufficiency in battalion operations in rural and remote areas. A battalion has four combat companies. It has integrated transportation and communications platoons for operations and repair. It should have radio communication capabilities down to the half squad level. Truck transportation is to be sufficient to move one-third of the battalion to any point in the operational area. Each battalion is to have sufficient armored personnel carriers for firepower against road ambushes.

An intelligence platoon is attached to the battalion for organizing and maintaining contact with informers and conducting investigations among the civilian population. A medical detachment is supposed to provide on-site care to wounded and transportation of wounded; and it has a mission of carrying out medical civic action programs for civilians.

Finally, a Civil Relations Section at battalion headquarters, commanded by a Civil Relations Officer, is responsible for liaison with civilians, advising the battalion commander on policies that affect civilians, instructing the troops on conduct toward civilians, and advising on policies to attract insurgents to the government side.[54]

Army and Marine operations have focused on Region 10 (northern and northeast Mindanao) and Region 11 (eastern and southeastern Mindanao). The AFP has had seven battalions in Region 11, four Army and three Marine. Nine Army battalions have been in Region 10. They are especially concentrated around the Davao provinces and Davao City in Region 11 and the Agusan provinces in Region 10. Part of one Marine battalion operates in urban Davao City. Of the 60 Army and Marine battalions, 35 were on Mindanao as of March 1985.[55]

The Marines conduct squad sized patrols in their operational areas, according to Marine commanders. Their main objectives are to establish a continuing presence among the population, seek out any NPA guerrilla units, and destroy the CPP cadre in individual *barangays*. They also try to keep the roads open, prevent the use of the roads by the guerrillas, and limit the movement of supplies from urban areas to NPA units in the countyside. The Marines, Army, and PC set up checkpoints along roads to examine and/or search vehicles.

Army operations have been similar, but not all Army commanders accept the small unit patrolling concept. Some commanders believe that the AFP instead should stress bigger unit sweeps to keep the NPA off balance and prevent it from organizing larger units.

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[54] Valeriano, Napolean and Bohannan, Charles T.R. Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. New York, Praeger, 1962, p. 218–219; 255–269; American University. Foreign Area Studies. Philippines: A Country Study. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. p. 265; Radio Manila, April 27, 1983. Address by President Marcos in which he discussed the role of the combat battalions.

[55] Washington Post, March 16, 1985.

One officer interviewed in January said that his command was preparing big unit sweeps for the future.

Intelligence Operations.—In addition to the intelligence platoons attached to the combat battalions, the AFP has an array of intelligence organizations at different levels. The chief organization is the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA), whose Director is the suspended AFP Chief of Staff, General Fabian Ver. NISA supervises subordinate organizations and has its own people in the field. The major subordinate agency is the Intelligence Service of the Philippine Armed Forces, whose Military Intelligence Units reportedly operate throughout the country. They presumably oversee and work with the PC and Army intelligence services.[56]

The intelligence organs reveal little about their operations, but these appear to be of three types:

(1) intelligence operations aimed at killing or capturing the leaders of the CPP at the national and regional levels;

(2) intelligence operations aimed at identifying and eliminating CPP/NPA cadre and supporters in the *barangays*, and

(3) intelligence gathering on opposition sectoral and political organizations to determine the extent of CPP influence and the involvement of individuals in CPP-sponsored activities.

Other Elements of Strategy.—Philippine Government officials and AFP commanders emphasize other elements of counterinsurgency strategy in public statements and interviews. Most notable are dialog with civilians and civic action programs.[57] Privately, however, many people point out that the AFP conducts these only sporadically. Moreover, their comments suggest that the problems of dialog and civic action are part of a matrix of problems and deficiencies of the Government and AFP in counterinsurgency.

THE PROBLEM AREAS

Security at the Grass Roots

The establishment of security at the grass roots level has been a fundamental element in successful counterinsurgencies since World War II. Its importance is striking in the Philippines. The foundation of the CPP's organization and strategy is in the towns and rural areas.[58] The insurgency is first and foremost a struggle for political control of the towns and *barangays*.

The role of the local governments and police in counterinsurgency is vital in the initial stages of the insurgency, because the

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[56] American University. Foreign Area Studies. Philippines: A Country Study. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984. p. 275-276.

[57] See the series on civic action by Deputy Minister of Defense, Jose Crisol, during the last week of January 1985 in Bulletin Today.

[58] American Consulate, Cebu, Eastern Mindanao, and an Ominous Future, p. 5. In regions like Samar and eastern Mindanao where the AFP has concentrated units, the armed guerrillas usually relocate or disperse, but the CPP tries to preserve its organizational structure and lower level operations. The report of the U.S. Consulate in Cebu concerning Mindanao had this observation:

"The rash of incidents early in the year in the Agusan provinces, Surigao Sur and Bukidnon were attributed to spillover effects from the large number of NPA then roaming the Davao and Cotabato provinces. When peace and order improved in the latter areas, the rate of NPA incidents in the more northern provinces increased markedly. Yet, now that more military units have shifted to those northern provinces and the situation is quieter, there are still continuing reports of increased NPA propaganda and recruiting notwithstanding the military presence."

AFP and the national government are not involved at this time. It also is the case when the regular military withdraws from an area after anti-NPA operations. Civilian and military officials interviewed stressed that regular AFP units can not stay permanently in one place; local authorities and security forces must provide security after the military leaves.

Local government and security forces have two responsibilities in this regard: (1) to secure information about CPP activities and pass it to the appropriate level, and (2) to act against CPP/NPA personnel once they are identified.

Intelligence

The situation in many towns seems to be that the town mayors and the police units may not know of initial CPP activities in the *barangays*, especially the outlying rural *barangays*. Again, this happens in part because Philippine towns often cover wide geographical areas. The mayors are dependent on *barangay* captains or other *barangay* leaders like priests or school teachers for information. Comments from people interviewed suggested that *barangay* leaders sometimes do not pass the information to the mayor and police.

Several factors may explain this. *Barangay* officials and community leaders may not be sensitive to what is happening when a small group of strangers (who happen to be CPP operatives) visits the *barangay*, perhaps through an intermediary from a neighboring *barangay*. They may be influenced by the attitudes of fellow residents, who may be their relatives or friends. Some may be sympathetic to the activities of the CPP team and may hold their own grievances against higher authorities. Some may belong to a family-based faction that is antagonistic to the faction controlled by the *barangay* captain and/or the town mayors. Some no doubt share the view expressed by Bishop Federico Escaler of North Cotobato province, who adopted a policy for the clergy of the province of providing food, clothing and shelter to insurgents and refusing to give the AFP information on CPP-NPA activities.[59] Many *barangay* leaders apparently adopt a live-and-let-live attitude toward the new organization as it develops. A town official from Samar interviewed said that this kind of arrangement exists in most *barangays* in his region.

Fear eventually comes into play. A town official in Negros Occidental said the *barangay* captains are afraid to tell the mayor or police chief the identity of CPP-NPA members. (The CPP marks informers for assassination.)

Moreover, even the mayors may not be willing to acknowledge the problem or to act in some instances. Several of the mayors interviewed denied that the CPP-NPA was present in their towns despite comments from other people and other information to the contrary. In some instances, mayors no doubt fear assassination by the NPA. Mayors, too, may be disinclined to act because of parochi-

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[59] Washington Post, February 3, 1980; Veritas, April 29-May 5, 1984. Father Balweg, the famous NPA leader and former priest, said in his interview that "We usually contact a relative to see if it was all right to hold a meeting in a barrio. But nowadays, because of the popularity of the NPA cause, we usually go straight to a barangay official . . . We introduce ourselves and ask permission to hold a mass meeting."

al power considerations. The mayors apparently do not always have the best relationship with the police chief, since until March 1985 they did not have operational authority over police in their respective jurisdictions (The local police come under the jurisdiction of the Constabulary, part of the AFP). This obviously could limit cooperation in the exchange of information and actions against the CPP-NPA. Finally, several mayors stated that they did not want the Constabulary in their towns because of the bad behavior of PC personnel. (Deployment of the PC would be a normal government reaction if a mayor drew attention to Communist penetration in his town). This sentiment even came from a mayor on the CPP death list, who was interviewed with a .45 caliber pistol under his belt on the day after the NPA killed a CHDF member in his town.

In the initial stage of CPP penetration, the passing of information by *barangay* officials and residents to higher authorities would appear to be crucial in stopping the insurgents. The CPP cadre are still isolated at this juncture, not yet having integrated into *barangay* life. Their political organization does not exist or is rudimentary. There are no sparrow units or guerrilla militia. *Barangay* Busuit, San Ildefonso town, Bulacan province (central Luzon) reportedly was a case in point. A semi-legal (SLT) team of six cadre were apprehended by the PC in the *barangay* in May 1984 after residents reported its activities. Three were killed, and three escaped after a gun battle with the PC.[60]

Role of the Police

The police play a key role in both the gathering of information and acting against initial insurgent activity. After the imposition of martial law in 1972, President Marcos formed the Integrated National Police (INP). He placed all local police units in the new organization and gave the Constabulary supervision over it. Town mayors thus lost operational control over the police in their jurisdictions. The Philippine Government justified the formation of the INP on two grounds: (1) to prevent local politicians from using the police as "private armies" and (2) to upgrade and standardize the training and equipment of the police. The INP presently numbers about 50,000 men.[61]

The condition of police units in the towns indicates that the Government has failed to improve their capabilities to any meaningful extent. Training appears to be minimal. The Government set up an INP Academy in 1978 that provides a two year course. Classes have been small, however, normally numbering slightly over 100.[62]

The police seem to be generally ineffective in gathering information about initial CPP penetration of local areas. A typical town police unit has no intelligence section and no one trained in intelligence work. Even in a large city like Davao, the new PC commander, Colonel Laudemer Kahulugan, found that "there was no intelli-

[60] Times Journal, May 20, 1984.
[61] Foreign Area Studies, American University, Philippines: A Country Study, p. 281-282.
[62] Ibid., p. 282

gence, no police machinery to speak of . . ." when he assumed command in late 1984.[63]

The police also lack the manpower, transportation, and communication equipment that would aid intelligence gathering and in maintaining regular contact with people in the barangays. Visits to several towns with populations in the 40,000–60,000 range found that the police forces number around 30 each. They often have no jeeps or cars or, at best, one. In one province in Mindanao, the police in January had two jeeps, both in the capital city. There was no radio communication, except in one town.[64]

The problem appears to be equally severe with respect to police action against the CPP organization once the organizations are identified. The small size, lack of mobility and communication, and apparent lack of counterinsurgency training of INP units undoubtedly minimizes their ability to conduct such operations. Four or five trained sparrow units in a typical town are at least a match for an INP unit. A CPP branch in a *barangay* ordinarily will have extensive security procedures that only a sophisticated police operation could overcome.

The Civilian Home Defense Forces

Town mayors interviewed often emphasized the Civilian Home Defense Forces as the answer to local security. Military officials said that the CHDF is necessary since the regular AFP units can't be in every locality. Some, however, expressed doubts about the current role of the 65,000–70,000 CHDF. Information and observations indicate that such misgivings are well-founded.

According to Philippine military sources, the official government policy on the CHDF is to form units in an insurgency area once the regular military has pacified it, or to establish them in locales not affected by insurgency. In some instances, the scheme is carried out. The Marine Brigade in Region 11, for example, has a program to set up CHDF to operate when Marine units leave an area. Often, however, CHDF are established in high intensity insurgency regions by local officials, on occasion at the urging of AFP commanders who cannot provide regular forces to deal with the situation.[65]

Training appears to be a shortcoming of the CHDF; it is brief, usually one or two weeks. Training in some locales, such as central Luzon, takes place at PC camps. In Mindanao and Negros, training frequently occurs in the towns. Because of the short time, original training for CHDF personnel apparently covers weapons handling and drill but little else.

Follow-up training varies depending on the locale. Some mayors in Mindanao stated that Army airborne units come on Saturdays to drill the CHDF. There is no such follow-up in Negros Occidental. More importantly, the regular AFP does not as a rule assign men

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[63] Mindanao Daily Mirror (Davao), January 17, 1985.

[64] Ironically, Philippine military commanders said in interviews that the police is the main intelligence collecting unit at the local level. Military intelligence organs operate at the grass roots only in locales of high insurgency. In short, effective intelligence in towns and *barangays* seems generally lacking.

[65] Veritas, January 27, 1985, quoted the PC Commander for Negros Occidental province that the PC and Army units in the province "cannot provide security to farms and individuals." He proposed that individuals and organizations set up "special types" of CHDF.

to CHDF units for continuous training and leadership. The Marines appear to be a partial exception to this pattern. According to Marine officers in Davao, the Marines in Region 11 leave a squad or platoon in an area to continue training and working with the CHDF after the Marine company withdraws.

CHDF commanders usually are *barangay* captains or town mayors. They receive the same amount of military training as the CHDF unit or no training at all. The mayors and *barangay* captains select the members of CHDF units, and standards for recruits vary accordingly. The standards appear to be higher if the regular AFP is supervising the effort. The Marines select only men with jobs and property. The unemployed and individuals of poor character are prohibited. PC officers in Region 11 said that the proper procedures should include consultation with *barangay* schoolteachers and priests concerning the character of prospective recruits.

Several people interviewed, including KBL provincial and town officials, claimed that "bad elements" often are admitted into the CHDF where they are unruly and use their weapons to bully and assault civilians. Others noted that recruits are sometimes political supporters of mayors and *barangay* captains. Local politicians in some regions reportedly used the CHDF in the May 1984 elections to get out their vote and intimidate potential supporters of their opponents.[66]

The CHDF has few resources. Units have no transportation or radios. AFP officers state that a CHDF unit has to send runners to a regular military camp in case of an emergency. In short, a CHDF unit is typically on its own if it encounters an NPA guerrilla unit. Knowledgeable U.S. officials contend that in recent cases of NPA attacks on towns, the CHDF offered a token defense or no defense and surrendered their weapons to the guerrillas.

One observation from visits to towns is that the CHDF probably does not function most of the time. CHDF personnel are not paid, although mayors and *barangay* captains may provide some stipend out of local funds. Without pay, resources, and military leadership, many CHDF personal probably return to their civilian pursuits once they complete their training.

Military-Civilian Relations

There is a severe strain in relations between the AFP and civilians, and a resultant alienation of people from the Government. People interviewed in every locale spoke of two issues: abuses and corruption. Their assertions point to fundamental problems in the Constabulary, although some complaints were directed at the Army.

ABUSES

One can define two general types of abuses of civilians according to the degree of physical force and who commits them. The first category includes drunken behavior of troops, checkpoint shakedowns, and stealing from civilians. During interviews in January 1985, the Constabulary was the object of numerous complaints in

[66] Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, May 7, 1984.

all of these areas. Enlisted men appear to be the prominent culprits. Mayors in central Luzon emphasized drunkenness of off-duty PC soldiers. Drunken behavior, they said, was made worse by the fact that off-duty soldiers usually carry their weapons. (Davao residents interviewed leveled similar complaints at the CHDF.) Businessmen in Mindanao claimed the PC personnel at checkpoints often demanded money or took gasoline or goods from vehicles. Other observers, including priests, said that PC and Army patrols often stole food from villagers. One high ranking Constabulary officer acknowledged that PC troops in the field "foraged" for food (i.e., stole food) from civilians.

The second category involves summary executions (dubbed "salvaging"), torture, and disappearances. Cases reportedly involve suspected members of the CPP and NPA, suspected supporters of the insurgents, and individuals involved in other activities that the military views as subversive.

Individual cases of abuses have been documented widely.[67] The 1984 human rights report of the State Department cities figures from the Philippine Task Force on Detainees (TFD) that the military executed 108 people in the first six months of 1984 and 368 in 1983.[68] The TFD also lists 53 persons as having disappeared while in military custody during the first half of 1984. The State Department's report also refers to persons reportedly tortured after being arrested for national security offenses. The staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gives the following assessment:

> But the most insidious form of violence is the AFP's alleged practice of torturing suspected NPAs and their sympathizers during interrogations. Although many of the people detained by the military are undoubtedly 'subversives' in the correct sense of the term, it is equally probable that many of them are not. People everywhere, even military and civilian officials, speak openly of AFP abuses and the use of excessive force. It is apparently common practice for civilians suspected of subversion to be picked up, taken to the nearest detachment headquarters, and interrogated unmercifully.[69]

The responsibility for these abuses appears to lie primarily with the PC, Army, and intelligence agencies. Commanders and officers are involved extensively. Many of the incidents reportedly take place right after the arrest of a suspect. Suspects are taken to "safe houses" for "tactical interrogation."[70] Officers of the intelligence

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[67] See the State Department's annual reports on human rights. See also Amnesty International. Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines. London, Amnesty International Publications, 1982.

[68] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Foreign Affairs. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984. 99th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985, p. 847. (Hereafter this will be referred to as State Department Human Rights Report for 1984.) U.S. officials accept the TFD's statistics as generally accurate, but they express doubts that the TFD is credible in always describing the people executed as innocent civilians.

[69] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The situation in the Philippines, p. 41.

[70] Asian Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1985. General Tan-Gatue acknowledged the existence of safe houses.

agencies are alleged to use torture in conducting the interrogations. Suspects reportedly are held incommunicado during this period of interrogation with no notification of family, friends, or legal counsel. Disappearances and executions reportedly occur sometimes after such interrogation.[71]

Lawyers in Davao involved in such cases brought up the policy of "zoning" as another practice sometimes resulting in abuses. The AFP conducted zoning during the Huk rebellion, although Magsaysay modified it. Zoning involves the cordoning off of an area, the gathering of all residents at a central point where the military interrogates individuals and conducts house-by-house searches. The lawyers charged that in zoning operations in Davao, military personnel often do not wear name tags on uniforms. Vehicles do not carry license plates. Citizens complain that troops use these operations as a cover to steal property. According to the Davao lawyers, persons arrested during zoning often are killed or tortured.[72]

ASSESSMENT

The Philippine Government undoubtedly is correct that CPP-NPA members and supporters have falsified some incidents of alleged abuses in order to discredit the AFP. Nevertheless, it appears that the PC and Army bear a heavy responsibility for many cases. Moreover, AFP commanders interviewed in January showed little awareness of the importance of public perceptions of AFP abuses. Some AFP field officers apparently give little weight to the impact of popular reaction to abuses. Most reported cases of abuse involve local people who ordinarily have a wide range of relatives and personal friends in the *barangay* and beyond. Thus, an incident of torture or execution involving just one person has the potential to turn an entire community against the AFP.

Some elements in the AFP appear to hold a generalized suspicion of the people living in an insurgency area. In dealing with the people and with suspects, they seem to make minimal effort to differentiate among types of relationships between people and the CPP/NPA, degrees of support or involvement with the insurgents, and motivations for acts of assistance to the insurgents. One high-ranking officer interviewed, for example, questioned the value of civic action projects for people in insurgency areas because, as he put it, the assistance would go to the NPA.

Several commanders were intent in interviews on denying responsibility for abuses; thus, they did not discuss the problem of preventing abuses by their units in the future and/or preventing circumstances from arising in which their troops easily could be accused of committing abuses.

Civil Relations officers, created by Magsaysay as a watchdog over AFP conduct toward civilians, were described by U.S. officials and knowledgeable Filipinos as having no power in the current situation. The U.S. State Department also stated in its human rights reports for 1983 and 1984 that government investigations of reported abuses "are often not pursued with vigor" and that military per-

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[71] State Department Human Rights Report for 1984, p. 849. Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines.

[72] For a press description of zoning, see Business Day, December 14, 1984.

sonnel found guilty of abuses "are seldom seriously punished." [73] Such individuals usually are transferred to another region.[74]

Meanwhile, interviews with AFP officers show that the Government's insensitivity to the need for more effective civilian relations is reflected in the absence of efforts to woo guerrillas and their supporters away from the CPP cause. The AFP does not offer rewards for voluntary surrenders and/or information. It apparently makes little effort to rehabilitate individuals under detention. AFP officers on Mindanao said in January that the Government has no program to resettle CPP/NPA members or supporters who cooperate with authorities and fear returning to their home villages. Few are won to the Government's side, say knowledgeable sources. This contrasts with the effective attraction program employed against the Huks and the more recent successes in attracting Muslim insurgents. Recent government statements show an awareness of the need for an attractions program.

CORRUPTION

Civilians interviewed on Mindanao and Negros complained profusely about corruption in the PC. Businessmen and journalists in Davao and Cagayan de Oro charged that PC officers and enlisted men were involved in illegal gambling and extortion. Individuals in Negros cited illegal logging in the mountains as commonly practiced by PC officers.

A number of those making the accusations were anti-government in their attitudes, but this was not true of several businessmen. Other, decidedly pro-government businessmen also have accused the PC.[75] Defense Minister Enrile has stated that:

> Some of the officers who have not been successful against the NPA are too interested in other things, like running gambling dens, logging operations, prostitution rings and illegal cock fights.[76]

Two recently publicized incidents point up the problem. Davao residents stated that three criminal syndicates were uncovered in the city in late 1984; PC enlisted men were involved in each one. This appears to be part of a longstanding pattern of PC corruption in Davao.[77] Open warfare broke out between military factions in

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[73] State Department Human Rights Report for 1984, p. 848; State Department Human Rights Report for 1983, p. 859.

[74] By alienating civilians through such abuses, the security forces and intelligence agencies have undercut their ability to identify members of Communist political organizations in the rural towns and *barangays* and to eliminate the organizations. This contrasts with the intelligence agencies' apparently greater successes in the cities in locating CPP leaders and identifying NDF operatives in sectoral groups.

The difference may lie in the mobile, impersonal nature of the urban environment compared to the stratified, interpersonal makeup of the rural *barangays*. For example, intelligence agents are potentially more effective in the cities. An agent can infiltrate an urban group made up of people from different backgrounds and locales. He can gain information through observation and participation in the group activities.

On the other hand, outsiders stand out in the rural *barangays*. Intelligence agencies, therefore, need information and cooperation directly from local people on a sustained basis. That requires a willingness of local people to cooperate. It appears that the intelligence agencies are not receiving that kind of cooperation at least partly because of the alienation through abuses.

[75] Christian Science Monitor, February 11, 1985. Comments of Alfonso Lim, businessman and reportedly a close friend of President Marcos.

[76] New York Times, November 26, 1984.

[77] American Consul, Cebu, Eastern Mindanao and Ominous Future, p. 8.

Zamboanga City in western Mindanao as criminal groups struggled for control. Four PC personnel were among 14 persons accused in February 1985 of murdering the mayor of Zamboanga. Two months earlier, Salipada Pendatun, the acting speaker of the National Assembly, asked Defense Minister Enrile and General Ramos to withdraw the PC and Army from Zamboanga. Pendatun charged that "officers have acquired official a. personal interests which are conflicting with each other." [78]

The Government and AFP high command have done little about corruption, despite the complaints and publicity. Filipino observers noted that corrupt PC officers have protectors among civilian power brokers in particular regions and are immune from actions by honest provincial or regional commanders, unless Manila supported such actions.

ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS

Several civilian critics of AFP misconduct stated that the majority of officers and enlisted men were blameless and that a minority of wrongdoers had given the military a bad name. Every civilian interviewed in Davao praised the conduct of the Philippine Marines. They pointed out that Marine troops are courteous toward civilians and that the Marines do not use checkpoints to shake down citizens. They stated that Colonel Rodolfo Biazon, the Marine commander, went out of his way to communicate with citizens' groups. He reportedly ordered his troops in the Agdao section of Davao to conduct no illegal arrests or detentions, and he agreed not to conduct zoning.[79] Knowledgeable sources stated that Marine policy is to prohibit physical contact with people being interrogated and that the Marines stress the rehabilitation of captured insurgents. The Marines were reported in early 1985 to be pressing the Government to set up a resettlement program for rehabilitated CPP-NPA members or supporters who do not wish to return to their villages for fear of reprisals.

Persons interviewed noted that the Marines in Agdao do "small things," like playing with the children, that improve civil-military relations.[80] They also stated that the NPA in Davao and Region 11 did not stage attacks on the Marines because of the Marine's good reputation with the populace and because of heavy NPA losses in past assaults. The Marines reportedly had eliminated the CPP-NPA from about a dozen *barangays* in Davao as of March 1985.[81]

Civilian critics also singled out individual Constabulary commanders for praise. The head of a Chamber of Commerce, for example, related that a provincial PC commander removed checkpoints when businessmen complained of shakedowns. Others referred to another provincial PC commander, who has a policy of

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[78] Richardson, Michael. Reforms in the Philippine Armed Forces; but Will They Work? Pacific Defense Reporter, March 1985, p. 37; Washington Post, December 3, 1984; Radio Manila, February 9, 1984.

[79] Business Day, December 14, 1984.

[80] Magsaysay made playing with children a major policy of the AFP during the Huk insurgency. He procured large amounts of candy for troops to pass out in the villages. Large Filipino families make the attitude of children a potentially important component in military-civilian relations.

[81] Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1985.

notifying the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) when his command takes in suspects. He then allows IBP lawyers to be present at interrogations. IBP lawyers noted that there were no cases of executions or torture involving his command. Other individual commanders reportedly have stepped up efforts to engage in dialogs with civilian groups concerning military-civilian relations.[82]

Military Resources

According to interviews and recent reports, the resources problem for the military is severe. It has been exacerbated by the current economic crisis in the Philippines, especially inflation rates that have been in the neighborhood of 50 percent per annum. It restricts the ability of the military to carry out operations and programs like civic action. It contributes to military misconduct toward civilians. Interviews suggest that it is beginning to have a debilitating effect on military morale.

Several commanders asserted that the resources problem was not one of insufficient weapons. Marine officers did say that Marine platoons could use more grenade launchers and heavy machine guns. Other commanders said that additional armored personnel carriers (APC's) would help in dealing with road ambushes.[83] Their emphasis, nevertheless, was on transportation and communication equipment, food, clothing, medicines and medical care, and pay.

There are several apparent reasons for the resources problem. The first is the low level of Philippine defense spending. Philippine defense budgets for the last ten years have been the lowest in non-Communist East Asia. More importantly, Philippine defense expenditures have been at or near the bottom regionally in terms of dollars spent per individual member of the armed forces. This low level has become more pronounced in the 1980s because of the Philippine's mounting economic and financial difficulties.

The following chart shows spending per individual member of the armed forces for several East Asian non-Communist countries for selected years since 1976.

	1976	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Taiwan	$2,127	$5,931	$7,305	$7,858	$7,758	$7,161	$7,384
Indonesia	4,504	6,150	8,553	8,754	10,877	10,213	8,992
South Korea	2,521	5,201	5,766	7,321	8,607	7,085	6,937
Malaysia	5,693	10,828	22,272	22,058	20,979	23,610	17,500
Thailand	2,580	4,351	4,718	5,378	6,167	6,146	7,030
Philippines	3,628	5,286	4,897	5,532	5,621	4,500	4,060

Source: Per capita military personnel figures calculated from figures in the annual issues of the Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

[82] See, for example, the accounts of the dialog program of Brigadier Jose Magno, Commander of Region 3 (central Luzon) in Metro-Manila Times, October 15, 1984, December 13, 1984 and April 9, 1985; Quezon City Broadcasting System broadcast, November 30, 1984. The radio broadcast described a meeting presided over by General Magno and the Archbishop of Bulacan province and attended by lawyers of individuals who claimed to be the victims of military abuses.

[83] A reported example occurred in January when an estimated 80 NPA guerrillas ambushed an Army convoy on the highway east of Cagayan de Oro in northern Mindanao. Colonel Roberto Lastimoso, PC Commander of Misamis Oriental province, credited the convoy's armored personnel carrier for the successful defense.

Low Philippine defense budgets have been matched by relatively low levels of military aid. U.S. military assistance for the period 1962–1979 totaled $523.6 million, an average of $30 million per year. This compares to $1,894 million in military aid for Taiwan during the same period, $5,721 million for South Korea, and $1,209 million for Thailand. Indonesia was the only U.S. military aid recipient in East Asia to receive less ($364 million).

U.S. military aid to the Philippines increased beginning in 1980 under the provisions of the 1979 U.S.-Philippines agreement on American-operated bases. Aid levels rose to $250 million in fiscal year 1980–1983 period.[84] However, $200 million of this was in foreign military sales credits, repayable at existing double digit interest rates. As of March 1983, the Philippine Government had chosen to delay utilizing about $100 million of the FMS because of its deteriorating financial situation.[85] Thus, utilized aid levels in the FY 1980–1983 were no greater than the annual average for the previous period.

It also appears that Philippine defense spending priorities have given only partial emphasis to resources for troops on the ground and equipment most useful in counterinsurgency. Substantial amounts of money went instead for the purchase of sophisticated weaponry designed for air and sea defense and heavy ground weaponry. Moreover, it appears that until at least mid-1983, the U.S. Government encouraged spending for air and sea defenses to help counter the Soviet naval and air buildup in the South China Sea region. Admiral Robert Long, U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, stated in June 1983 that:

> With regard to the need for the Philippines to modernize their own defense forces, I think that also is clearly in the interest of the United States. I am going back again to the very basic point I have tried to make, and that is there is a constancy in the Soviet pursuit of Soviet objectives. We cannot shoulder the entire burden all by ourselves. We have, as a matter of policy, continued to ask friends and allies of the free world to do more for their own self-defense.
>
> Any country looking to its own self-defense must have the ability to protect its ground, the air above and the seas surrounding it, and the Philippines presently cannot accomplish these tasks.[86]

Congressional presentations on U.S. security assistance in the late 1970s and for fiscal years 1980–1982 stated that the Philippine Government would utilize a sizeable portion of military aid for naval landing craft, howitzers, fighter aircraft, naval vessels, and spare parts for ships and aircraft. The FY 1980 presentation said

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[84] U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 1983, p. 77.

[85] U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. United States-Philippines Relations and the New Base and Aid Agreement. Hearings, 98th Congress, 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983, p. 49.

[86] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. United States-Philippines Relations and the New Base and Aid Agreement, p. 47.

that such equipment would aid the Philippines to achieve "self-reliance in national defense, a goal which the United States supports."

The Philippine Government's priorities in the dispersement of equipment for ground forces may have been oriented to Manila-based military units rather than units in insurgency areas. The AFP high command, for example, is known to have kept a sizeable number of armored personnel carriers, armored cars, and trucks in metropolitan Manila. The Manila-based security units were enlarged and strengthened in the 1970's under the direction of General Ver. They have the distinct mission of providing security for the President and agencies of the Government in the capital. The Presidential Security Command, which is responsible for the physical protection of President Marcos and his family, has an estimated strength of 15,000.[87]

A final reason is the reputed existence of corruption in the AFP. Knowledgeable individuals spoke of a "traditional" practice by Filipino officials of "skimming" government money for personal use as funds pass through the procurement process. These individuals expressed a belief that such "skimming" affected the allocation of Philippine Government defense funds and U.S. military aid money. They cited no specific examples, however; and they gave no estimates of the value of money that is "skimmed." Nevertheless, the possibility of skimming is suggested by corruption in the AFP at the local level and by the reported outside, lucrative business activities of some high ranking AFP commanders.

TRANSPORTATION

In comparison with conditions prevailing during the Huk period and authorized levels of equipment, the transportation situation of the AFP is dismal. The PC appears to be in the worst condition. Two provincial PC commanders stated in interviews that their units (three companies each) had no trucks. One commander had two jeeps; the other had none. When asked how he would move his headquarters company to a trouble spot, one commander said he would go to the provincial capital and borrow jeepneys (a modified jeep used for public transportation) from civilians. Both commanders added that their two companies in the field were strictly on foot. Knowledgeable U.S. officials stated that this is a typical pattern.

The situation in the Army and Marine Corps is only slightly better. An Army battalion normally has one or two trucks, four or five jeeps, no armored personnel carriers, and no helicopters. (The officially authorized equipment is ten trucks and ten jeeps.) A knowledgeable U.S. source said that a typical Army battalion's transport could move no more than five percent of its combat manpower to a specific area. This contrasts with the one-third capability achieved by many battalions during the Magsaysay period. In January, the Marine Brigade in Region 11 had four trucks, one APC, and one helicopter—hardly adequate for a broad geographic region with a rugged topography and active insurgency.

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[87] Niksch, Larry A. The Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific Region; The Philippines: Uncertainties After the Aquino Assassination. Pacific Defence Reporter, February 1984, p. 21-30.

Knowledgeable Filipino and U.S. sources cited "critical" shortages of gasoline and shortages of spare parts for vehicles. U.S. sources described the logistics and maintenance system as "poor to non-existent." Maintenance capabilities and availability of spare parts are especially important because most trucks are older models. AFP gasoline shortages in Region 11 reportedly have led at least one prominent businessman to donate gasoline to the military.[88]

The result of transportation shortages is a military that is footbound, restricted to defending fixed positions, unable to react to insurgent initiatives, and unable to act if patrols or other reconnaissance units should locate NPA units. This was illustrated by an attack on an Army outpost by 200 NPA guerrillas in Zamboanga del Sur province, Mindanao, on December 1, 1984. The Government's account stressed that the outpost beat off repeated assaults, but it is noteworthy that it took *seven hours* for reinforcements to arrive from the battalion headquarters.[89] Several similar incidents have occurred since then.

The impact of inadequate transportation may grow in the future. If the NPA increases big unit operations, including the apparently planned attacks on major towns in Mindanao in 1986 and 1987, the AFP likely will be unable to move forces sufficiently to counter the guerrillas. The end result could be a pullback of the AFP into the big towns and a tactical abandonment of the smaller towns and rural areas on Mindanao and perhaps on the other islands.

COMMUNICATIONS

Shortages of radios add to the mobility and reaction deficiencies. Commanders described radios as old, 1960's vintage models with a growing number that do not work. Squad-sized patrols do not have radio communication because of the shortage; CHDF and INP units lack radios. This limits their ability to communicate vital information and to call for assistance. Even intelligence agents do not have radios, according to a U.S. source. Agents must travel to AFP posts to report, since the military does not have the vehicles to get around in order to contact agents.

CIVIC ACTION

A number of people interviewed advocated increased civic action programs. The reality, however, is that the AFP does little civic action in part because of lack of funds, medicines, and equipment. Town mayors were unanimous in saying that the AFP conducted no civic action in their towns or, at best, small programs months apart. Commanders said they had no money for civic action; most stated that they would like money and equipment for well drilling and road building. U.S. sources described the two Army engineer-

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[88] Baltimore Sun, February 19, 1985; Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1985.

[89] Manila Far East Broadcasting Company broadcast, December 2, 1984. Philippine press reports indicated that in an NPA attack on the town of Cortez in Surigao del Sur province (northeast Mindanao) on April 3, 1985, AFP reinforcements did not arrive until 4½ hours after the attack began. In another attack, this one against a military outpost in the town of Tubugan, Iloilo province (Panay Island), reinforcements took four hours to arrive on the scene.

ing battalions as having only 25 percent of their authorized equipment; most of that, they said, was over 20 years old.

Several town officials praised two kinds of civic action programs: (1) programs conducted by the Rotary and Lions Clubs in and around Davao and Cagayan de Oro on Mindanao, and (2) the medical civic action program conducted in central Luzon by the U.S. Air Force at Clark Air Base.

FOOD AND CLOTHING

Commanders have viewed the quality and quantity of clothing provided to the military as inadequate. One noted that boots wear out prematurely. Another stated that the centralized system of clothing procurement has broken down because the AFP could not pay manufacturers higher prices as the cost of their materials rose. Consequently, individual Army and PC units procure their clothing in the local markets.

Shortages of food have a more immediate impact on military conduct. Several Filipino and U.S. sources acknowledged that troops in the field do not have full field rations and often steal from civilians, even though troops are instructed to buy food. One commander described the situation as a "dangerous practice." Unless the Government and AFP provide adequate supplies of food, they could end the stealing only through a sharp curtailment of current field operations, including patrolling.

MEDICAL CARE

According to knowledgeable U.S. sources, the AFP casualty rate is three killed per day. The sources made the point that the killed-to-wounded ratio is abnormally high, because of poor medical care. One source cited as an example the highly publicized AFP offensive in the mountains of northern Luzon in July 1984. Thirty percent of the AFP personnel in the operation, he said, were casualties because of: (1) pneumonia, the result of inadequate clothing for the cool, rainy mountain weather, and (2) malaria, due to the lack of preventive pills.

These sources and Filipino commanders said that medicines often are unavailable. One source claimed that the Army cannot even adequately equip and stock with medicine its major hospital at Fort Bonafacio in Manila. Many provincial and regional command headquarters have no hospital facilities. The AFP must rely on government and civilian hospitals for care of the wounded. There is no medical evacuation capability due to the absence of helicopters and shortages of other vehicles. When asked how units under his command evacuated wounded personnel, one commander answered "by stretcher bearers." One source asserted that troops in the field know that if they are seriously wounded "they won't make it."

PAY AND LIVING CONDITIONS

Pay and allowances for most enlisted men in the AFP are in the range of 700–800 pesos per month ($38–$44 on the basis of the current exchange rate), according to Filipino commanders. A Staff Ser-

geant makes around 1300 pesos per month ($72), and a Colonel about 3000 pesos per month ($166). One can see the hardship these salaries would impose on an individual enlisted man with a wife and a typically large number of children (four or more). A U.S. official cited an estimate that a non-commissioned officer, E–7, married with two children (an untypically small number) had no money left from his monthly salary after expenditures for food and housing. A provincial PC commander asserted that many of his men lived in the "worst slums" of the provincial capital because of low pay. On-base housing may be no better in many instances. Businessmen in Negros Occidental province reportedly organized a fund early in 1985 to help improve "the enlisted men's miserable quarters" at PC and Army bases.[90]

Several individuals interviewed, who complained about corruption in the military, stated that there was a clear correlation between low pay and other inadequate resources and military misconduct. An enlisted man or low ranking officer may exploit opportunities to supplement income that are illegal. One commander stated that a corporal usually was in charge of PC checkpoints; a non-commissioned officer normally would lead a squad-sized patrol. The correlation between low pay, lack of money to buy food, and misconduct is obvious in these situations.

A businessman in Davao made perhaps an astute observation in comparing abuses like checkpoint shakedowns in the PC with the apparent absence of such wrongdoing in the Marine Corps. He pointed out that a typical Marine enlisted man is young and unmarried, while the average PC enlisted man is married with several children. The salary for the Marine thus is more adequate than the salary of the PC enlisted man, reducing the incentive for corruption. It should be noted, however, that none of these observers used the correlation between pay and corruption to absolve higher ranking officers from responsibility for the situation, in terms of the illegal activities of some and the general unwillingness of others to discipline the men under them.

Training and Morale

Training is at the heart of a successful counterinsurgency program. It is essential to shift the orientation of the military away from conventional warfare to anti-insurgency operations. Retraining is necessary to keep the military from reverting to old habits and to assess and correct the errors of prior operations. It provides a necessary respite from combat and helps unit and individual morale.

With the exception of the Marines and perhaps a few individual Army units like the Scout Rangers, training in the AFP is widely reported to be of doubtful quality even in terms of instruction in conventional warfare. U.S. sources stated that there is no standardized training in the Army and PC. There are few centralized training camps. Recruits often are trained with the units with which

[90] Veritas, January 27, 1985.

they sign up. Training thus may be more "on the job" than real instruction. The Army and PC conduct little retraining.[91]

MORALE

Many commanders interviewed in January were dispirited over conditions within their respective services, the growth of the insurgency, and criticisms of the military. The reported military misconduct no doubt reflects similar low morale in the ranks. General Benjamin Divinagracia, Commander of the Third Infantry Division, reportedly commented that men under his command may have committed abuses in order to be transferred from high insurgency areas to other locales.[92] Stories now appear that patrols in the field consciously avoid contact with the guerrillas.[93] The CPP apparently senses a morale problem, as it has stepped up its appeals for AFP personnel to "join the people's struggle."

A desertion problem may be developing. A knowledgeable source cited Philippine Army estimates that ten percent of the Army recruits on Mindanao would desert with their weapons before their two-year term was up. This rate is much lower than the 30–35 percent desertion rate within South Vietnamese combat units during much of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, it could portend a serious problem for the future and thus bears watching. AFP commanders have acknowledged receiving reports that recently discharged AFP enlisted personnel had joined the NPA when they could not find civilian employment.[94]

The Lack of Non-Communist Political Unity

The CPP based its decision in 1983 to escalate united front activities in the cities on the assumption that the Marcos administration would not reach accommodation with the political opposition groups that emerged after the Aquino assassination. So far, the CPP has been correct in this calculation. Marcos and even the most conservative elements in the opposition remain hostile toward each other. President Marco shows little willingness to accept political measures advocated by the opposition. Some opposition groups thus cooperate with CPP front elements as a means of escalating pressure on the Government. The CPP accordingly gains political legitimacy and influence. Non-Communist spokesmen sometimes excuse CPP acts of violence as provoked by an oppressive regime. The Government, on the other hand, encounters major difficulty in making anti-insurgent measures acceptable to the public. Non-Communist opposition groups often view such acts as self-serving and intended to perpetuate President Marcos' powers. Examples of this state of affairs include the campaigns against "militarization" waged by non-Communist opposition groups and CPP mass organizations in insurgency areas, the proposal of non-Communist spokes-

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[91] Bulletin Today, December 24, 1984. Statement of Brigadier Benjamin Divinagracia, Commander of the Third Infantry Division. See also People's Daily Forum (Davao), February 2, 1985, for a description of the Marines' shift to counterinsurgency training.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Munro, Ross H. Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win. Foreign Policy, Fall 1984, p. 173–190. According to Munro, fear of wounds and knowledge of inadequate treatment capabilities are a prime reason for avoiding contact with the NPA.

[94] Times Journal (Manila), April 26, 1985.

men for "legalization" of the CPP, and opposition demands for the release of "political prisoners," including CPP leaders like Jose Sison and CPP/NDF cadre.

Recent Moves to Reform?

Since General Fidel Ramos became acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in November 1984, the Government and AFP have shown more awareness of the insurgency problem, at least in public. Ramos reportedly sent President Marcos a study of the situation with emphasis on the military's problems and some recommendations. The Government and the AFP have announced several measures which appear to address some (but not all) of the problems discussed above. The most important measures are:

(1) Ramos has moved armored cars and jeeps out of Manila to units in the field. The Marines in Region 11, for example, recently received V150 armored cars.[95]

(2) President Marcos announced a program to modernize the equipment of the AFP and bring equipment up to authorized levels. The Government plans to stress transportation and communication equipment. The program is slated to cost $100 million over a five year period.

(3) The Government had directed city and town mayors to prepare integrated security defense plans. The mayors are to draw up the plans in cooperation with local INP and military officials. Military units with training responsibilities for CHDF units are to retrain them. Marcos has given the mayors operational control over INP units in their towns with the proviso that the Government can withdraw this in individual cases.

(4) Ramos has established a seven man committee to investigate complaints of military abuses. The Deputy Chief of Staff is the chairman. Ramos also has added new members to INP boards dealing with promotions and conduct.

(5) Ramos has ordered the activation of disciplinary barracks to be used for the retraining of soldiers guilty of misconduct.

(6) The Government has announced a one billion peso ($55 million) civic action program under which the AFP is to become involved in projects such as *barangay* roads, school buildings, irrigation systems, and well drilling. The AFP is to coordinate its work with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. The program will focus on insurgency regions.

(7) The Government announced an increase in the combat pay allowance for AFP personnel from 120 pesos (about $7) to 240 pesos.[96]

It remains to be seen whether or not the measures are implemented, whether implementation deals with the actual problems, and whether the funds allocated are sufficient. Individual officials in the Government and AFP favor the reform as a means to deal more effectively with the insurgency. On the other hand, the extent of Ramos' authority is uncertain, since he is the acting Chief of Staff. President Marcos has promised to reinstate General

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[95] People's Daily Forum (Davao), February 2, 1985.

[96] For a listing of some of these steps, see Embassy of the Philippines (Washington, D.C.). The Philippines Situation. April 1985, pp. 2-3.

Ver if he is acquitted in his trial on charges of involvement in the Aquino assassination.

If Ver is reinstated, he could be expected to continue some of the announced programs. It is doubtful, however, that he would act on other problems like the abuses issue. Since he has been the chief overseer of intelligence practices, Ver probably would allow the intelligence agencies to continue present practices. Moreover, he likely would give greater priority, as in the past, to equipment allocation for units in the Manila region.[97] Moreover, given Ver's close ties to Marcos and the ruling political party (KBL), money for civic action could flow easily under Ver's direction into the election machinery of local KBL organizations. The Government in the past (including 1984) has used public works funds to oil the election machinery of local KBL organizations.[98]

CONCLUSIONS

At this stage of the insurgency, the Communist Party is gaining strength and the Philippine Government does not have an effective counter strategy. The CPP-led movement has developed to the point where it seems to have a credible chance of overthrowing the Government within five to ten years if present trends continue. This appears to be the case despite the insurgents' problems in securing arms and their lack of outside support. The CPP could succeed primarily through the process of political takeovers at the grass roots, a breakdown of the social order in the cities, a disintegration of the key foreign exchange earning sectors of Mindanao's economy, and destruction of the urban economy. It would not have to form division-sized armies to defeat the AFP in big battles. It would need only to develop main force guerrilla units sufficient to tie down the AFP and isolate it. If the political and economic base of the Government disintegrates, the Armed Forces also would begin to disintegrate from within.

The current trend need not prevail indefinitely. Time is on the side of the CPP only as long as the Government makes mistakes that give the insurgents greater opportunities. If the Government begins to rectify the errors and weaknesses noted above regarding local security, civilian relations, resources, and training, the time factor could well revert to its advantage.

The Key to Success—Leadership and Resources

In other countries where incumbent governments have defeated communist insurgencies, a common pattern of factors existed that contributed to the success of the counterinsurgency. These involved primarily the conduct of the incumbent government and its armed forces.[99] The lessons from these cases no doubt apply to the Philip-

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[97] Niksch, Larry. The Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific Region; the Philippines: Uncertainties after the Aquino Assassination. Pacific Defence Reporter, February 1984, p. 21-30.

[98] President Marcos stated at a news conference on February 25, 1985, that civic action funds would go directly to provincial and municipal governments. Nearly all of these are headed by members of the KBL, who are up for re-election in 1986.

[99] U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Case Studies of Counter-insurgencies. Report No. 85-60F, by Larry A. Niksch. Washington, 1979, pp. 9-14. The report examined the cases of Malaya, the Philippines during the Huk insurgency, Greece, Venezuela, and Colombia.

pines and give the Philippine Government a number of options for the future.

The Philippine Government and Armed Forces require two basic ingredients to deal successfully with the insurgency: leadership and resources. Political and military leadership will have to demonstrate different qualities from those of the recent past and present in order for the Government to avoid the mistakes it presently is making.

Philippine experience in the 1950's and that of other effective counterinsurgency programs suggest that in formulating political, economic, and military policies, the Philippine Government and the AFP high command will have to give a much higher priority to the impact such policies have on the insurgency and the spread of Communist political influence.

President Marcos, himself, has several options in terms of changes in his style of leadership. President Marcos could downgrade his prediliction to make decisions primarily on the basis on their impact on his personal power and the status of members of his inner circle of relatives and political loyalists. He could shift the center of power in his government away from this inner circle (many of whom are blamed widely for the country's difficulties) and toward more reformist elements. President Marcos also has the option of beginning a sustained dialog or negotiation with the non-Communist political opposition. Moreover, if the Philippine Government needs additional U.S. financial assistance to meet its resource requirements, President Marcos could take American opinion and U.S. Government views into greater account than he has so far.

Ramon Magsaysay saw the dual requirements of leadership and resources when he became Secretary of Defense in 1950 and took control of the Philippine Government's campaign against the Huks. Magsaysay's policies combined reform of the AFP, including leadership changes, with a major upgrading of resources for the units in the field. This combination bolstered morale in the AFP, significantly altered the AFP's relations with the civilian population, and enabled the AFP to initiate and intensify military operations, programs to encourage Huk defection, and civic action projects aimed at civilians.

An application of this successful program suggests a need for military leaders, including a Chief of Staff, who are committed to changes in policies. President Marcos or any future President will have to give full time backing to the implementation of military reform measures. In order to implement reforms, the Chief of Staff must have contact with commanders and officers in the field and a staff organization to see that the lower echelons carry out reformist measures. Another beneficial ingredient would be leadership at lower levels that is competent, honest, professional and—at the political level—accountable to the public. Competent, professional, counterinsurgent officers could beneficially be promoted to command positions at the battalion level and above, as Magsaysay did during the Huk period. Training and education are the elements for producing an inflow of new, young leaders into the AFP.

Implementation of military reforms will not be totally successful in terms of counterinsurgency unless the Government and the AFP

solve the AFP's resources problems. The current shortages of material resources contributes to every other major problem of the AFP, including that of leadership in the field. Key operations require adequate resources. Operations and other tasks are dependent on factors of military morale, which are influenced by the material conditions of the troops.

The financial situation of the Government places limits on its ability to address the resources problem. There are, nevertheless, several options that President Marcos and the AFP high command could take or expand. They could see that units in the field receive priority in the allocation of equipment and supplies. The Chief of Staff could tighten oversight over the military procurement system to reduce the effects of any existing corruption or inefficiencies. An increase in defense spending also may be necessary despite the financial constraints.

The Immediate Tasks

A priority for the military is training and retaining for counter-insurgency tactics and strategy. It provides a foundation for carrying out other key tasks. The benefits in terms of development of leadership among lower-ranking officers and NCO's, performance, unit cohesion, and morale usually outweigh short-term losses from pulling units from field operations. Needed would be adequately equipped, fully provisioned, central training facilities. Troops would learn how to conduct small unit operations among civilians, including patrolling, intelligence work, training and working with local security units, protecting local officials and leaders, and conduct toward civilians.

Basic training is the foundation of a soldier's performance. The AFP, it would appear, needs to give more emphasis to it. Again, this will require central training facilities for standardized training by full time instructors and a longer period of training than recruits probably get today from units in the field.

Training could well emphasize existing units and providing replacements rather than lead to an expansion of the AFP. Expansion would likely magnify certain already severe problems. Training at this stage would most effectively be directed at rectifying them. This accomplished, a buildup in size could produce positive results. The exception seems to be the Marine Corps and perhaps elite Army units like the Rangers. Current Marine performance could justify an increase in the Corps' size in the near term.

The AFP shortfall in transportation and communications capabilities is substantial. More trucks and radios would be the most useful input in the short term, but the situation on Mindanao appears increasingly to warrant helicopter transport and armored personnel carriers to protect movement on roads. An upgrading of transportation and communications assets could be essential over the next two to three years in order to prevent the NPA from operating in larger units on a more permanent basis and striking at more important targets like major towns and provincial cities. Even if the AFP gives greater emphasis to small unit operations, the present stage of NPA development will require the AFP to maintain maneuverable battalions as quick reaction forces. More

transport also is necessary to supply units in the field and for medical evacuation.

The problem of security at the grass roots could be the most difficult counterinsurgency task over the next few years. Government policies to date seem full of errors, particularly with regard to the CHDF. A general re-thinking of the concept of local security forces may be indicated. Cost aside, a buildup of paid, full time police in the towns undoubtedly would be a better way to handle local security than the unpaid, part time CHDF. Police forces, however, need strengthening across the board. The size of police units in many towns would have to be increased five to ten fold in order to provide adequate manpower, but even a doubling or tripling of size could help. Training of existing personnel needs substantial upgrading with orientation toward insurgency. The INP Academy could expand its operations. Police units need considerably more transportation and communications equipment. Such a buildup would require substantial resources, and the benefits would have to be weighed against the costs.

If the Government continues to emphasize the CHDF as an economy measure, several changes could be considered. Extended training and close supervision by the regular AFP undoubtedly would help as would keeping CHDF in close proximity to regular military units most of the time for continuing training, combined operations, and reinforcement in emergencies. It can be argued that the AFP should *not* supply weapons to town mayors or *barangay* captains so they can form CHDF units in the present haphazard manner.

A separate but related option is to strengthen town governments financially so that they can provide basic services to people and thus gain public support. That may be impossible in the near term, however, because of the Philippines' financial and economic conditions. Despite this, popular support for local governments could be strengthened to a degree through a competitive electoral process. Even if a town government is financially weak, rural Filipinos are more likely to view it as *their* government if they are able to choose freely its officials. Rural Filipinos traditionally have supported electoral competition with large voter turnouts and participation. Elections in the past have usually provided a non-violent outlet for rivalries among family-based factions in the towns and *barangays*.

Nevertheless, democratic elections at the local level will not eliminate many of the factors responsible for insurgency growth in the rural areas. Competitive elections, by themselves, will not contain the CPP-NPA. For example, the insurgency has expanded rapidly in Misamis Oriental province (Mindanao) since 1981 despite a high degree of electoral competition and numerous victories by opposition parties. Competitive elections might provide the CPP with opportunities to run candidates and legalize its control in specific locales. Further, election tactics are often extreme, and violence is not uncommon, sometimes polarizing contending groups. Nevertheless, in the long run, competitive elections, coupled with other effective counterinsurgency measures, probably would reduce the appeal of violent conflict among rural Filipinos.

The issue of the AFP's relations with civilians encompasses all the complexities of an insurgency situation. The reasons for the AFP's apparent record of misconduct are a mixture of policies and procedures, poor political and military leadership, inadequate training, and declining morale. Thus, a mix of actions seem most likely to solve the problem. AFP commanders in Manila should consider making examples in the worst abuse cases through severe punishment of those responsible. One should not expect, however, that Manila would punish every officer who has been involved in a past abuses case. Filipinos, even on an official level, do not deal with one another in terms that absolute or demanding. Examples would be intended to signal military personnel to change behavior rather than as a forerunner of a wholesale purge.

Manila has cause to review the procedures of the intelligence agencies and field officers in dealing with suspected insurgents and supporters. This probably would be most effective if it were part of a policy aimed at wooing and rehabilitating insurgents and gaining cooperation and information from them and other citizens. This would require the AFP—backed by the Government—to offer inducements and rewards such as jobs and money and promises of amnesty for voluntary surrender. The precedents established during the Huk and Muslim insurgencies offer a guide to a potentially effective approach.[100]

This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the AFP must follow Western legal processes in handling suspected insurgents. Successful counterinsurgencies, including that of Magsaysay, have combined attraction programs with indefinite incarceration of those who reject rehabilitation.[101] Treatment of imprisoned insurgents, however, should be consistent with the appeal of an attraction policy, not negate it.

Strengthening the role of Civic Relations Officers (CRO's) also may curtail future abuses. This would imply a considerable operational independence for the CRO's or Civil Relations units in an oversight, reporting, and recommending role to the AFP Chief of Staff. Field commanders would, in this option, include the CRO's in the planning of all operations.

It appears doubtful, however, that such measures would end abuses and corruption committed predominantly by enlisted men. These forms of abuse and corruption are linked too closely to the lack of basic necessities for the common soldier and his family. Soldiers in the field can be expected to take food from civilians if they have no field rations and little money. Without an improvement in the resources problem, punishment of offenders and a tightening of discipline likely would reduce these practices but probably on a temporary basis and at the cost of lower morale. Adequate pay,

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[100] The Muslim rebellion in the southern Philippines today is dormant, compared to its strength of 20,000 or more armed fighters in the 1970s and the many armed engagements it initiated at that time. Among the reasons for its decline is that the Philippine Government has coupled an amnesty program with incentives offered to Muslim commanders. Numerous commanders have surrendered since 1979, often with their entire units. The Government, in turn, has given many of them senior positions in local and provincial governments in Regions 9 and 12 and, reportedly, economic favors. See Tasker, Rodney. Calm on the Moro Front. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 9, 1984. p. 29–30; and Vokey, Richard. Islands Under the Gun. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8, 1981, p. 36–42.

[101] See CRS, Case Studies of Successful Counter-Insurgencies, p. 12, 21, 31, and 39.

food, clothing and medical care combined with stern discipline are basic conditions for a permanent solution to these problems.

A major increase in resources would be necessary for the AFP to carry out civic action programs sufficient to accomplish important objectives in counterinsurgency. Civic action does not constitute a program of fundamental social reforms, and it will not end conditions of poverty. It will not reach everyone. However, it can help attain certain tactical ends. Civic action programs like medical care, well drilling, and road building could meet some vital needs of poor Filipinos. Civic action undoubtedly could improve the bad public image of the AFP, a matter of no slight consequence. Moreover, it may be the only socioeconomic program the Philippine Government can provide in high insurgency areas like Mindanao. Civilian government officials and agencies increasingly are unwilling to work in high intensity insurgency areas.[102]

Financial constraints as well as insurgency conditions will prevent the Philippine Government from greatly expanding economic development programs. However, the government could improve the quality of programs and reduce the bias toward Manila and central and southern Luzon in the allocation of development expenditures. The government, too, could act more boldly in dealing with crises like the massive malnutrition in Negros Occidental province.[103] Finally, Manila could abolish policies and instructions that prevent farmers from receiving the market value of their products. Many experts charge price controls on food (meant to subsidize urban consumers) and the coconut and sugar purchasing/marketing monopolies have reduced farmers' earnings substantially.

The final category of options is the political one. Today, the Government stands isolated from other political power centers in the Philippines: businessmen, the leadership of the Catholic Church, middle class professionals, and the opposition political organizations. President Marcos currently does not engage in a sustained dialog or negotiation with the political opposition. This stands in contrast to the efforts of some AFP commanders such as General Magno and Colonel Biazon to communicate personally with groups critical of the Government in their respective locales. President Marcos would strike a blow against the CPP's united front strategy if he forged an anti-CPP front of cooperation with the major opposition groups. In order to do this, he could fully open the electoral process, negotiate compromises regarding his emergency powers, and allow legitimate opposition groups to exercise broad political and civil liberties. (Obviously, such measures are not without real risk.) Opposition leaders, in turn, could end dialog and cooperation with CPP (many have begun to move away from cooperation with

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[102] American Consul, Cebu, Eastern Mindanao and an Ominous Future, p. 19. The report noted "the problem of convincing government workers to visit areas where they are most needed, but this is impeded by poor roads and, in many places, the NPA. . . . Unfortunately, even were GOP officials to begin taking a more active interest, NPA presence in many areas adds to the risks faced by each official seeking to visit areas of discontent."

[103] As of July 1985, the Philippine Government had not asked the United States for emergency food aid for Negros Occidental. Government officials and prominent citizens of the province told the author in January that they would welcome increased U.S. food aid.

the CPP/NDF), renounce the CPP's call for a coalition government, and support effective counterinsurgency programs.

Major cases of successful counterinsurgencies against nationwide Communist-led movements in the post-World War II period (Greece, Malaya, the Philippines during the Huk period, Venezuela, Colombia, and, most recently, Thailand) involved governments that maintained or expanded popular participation in electoral politics despite the insurgents. Governments were able to form a united front of non-insurgent political parties to oppose the Communists. This sometimes took the form of a coalition government or power sharing arrangements; and in other cases, governments and opposition parties reached a consensus related to the insurgencies and political conduct generally. These actions limited Communist appeal in the cities and among the non-insurgent opposition political groups. They also served to make broadly acceptable control measures aimed specifically at the insurgents.[104]

It is doubtful that the Philippine Government and political and military leaders will adopt effective counterinsurgency measures in the remainder of 1985 and 1986. Most of President Marcos' actions so far in 1985 indicate a rejection of basic reforms. Marcos sent a strong signal of resistance in March 1985 when he fired Arturo Tolentino from his post as Foreign Minister. Tolentino had been outspoken in urging political reforms. As stated previously, Marcos promised to reinstate General Ver as Chief of Staff if Ver is acquitted in the Aquino assassination trial. President Marcos continues to speak disparagingly of the opposition, and he frequently has downgraded the seriousness of the Communist insurgency.

On the other hand, the recently announced military reform measures do address some problems of the AFP. General Ramos seems to be trying to build a momentum for further steps. He apparently receives support from one or more groups recently formed by active duty officers called "Reform AFP Movement" or "We Belong." Marcos, Defense Minister Enrile, and Ramos, have met with leaders of these new groups. These developments could improve prospects for reform in the longer term.

Politically, the opposition has started to press President Marcos on procedures for the 1986 elections. Opposition leaders are calling for the appointment of several new people to vacant positions on the Commission on Elections. They also seek the accreditation of NAMFREL, the citizens' poll watching group that played a prominent role in the 1984 elections. This pressure on President Marcos undoubtedly will grow in the second half of 1985.

The issue of election procedures and the status of Generals Ver and Ramos represent in the near term key determinants of the counterinsurgency reforms. The outcome of these issues either will produce initial steps toward effective counterinsurgency measures or it will preclude them indefinitely. The outcome also will affect U.S. attitudes and policies, as indicated by recent expressions of congressional sentiment.

For the insurgency itself, the key question is whether the CPP can move the insurgency into a more advanced stage in 1986 and

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[104] Ibid.

1987. This question can be broken down into three components: (1) the ability of the NPA on Mindanao to attack and temporarily occupy provincial capitals and larger towns, force the AFP out of the countryside and into defensive positions around these cities and towns, and begin to destroy the key sectors of Mindanao's economy, (2) the ability of the CPP to make major organizational gains in the strategically important region of central Luzon and expand armed insurgency there beyond the present stage (which primarily consists of assassinations); and (3) the ability of the CPP to launch and sustain assassinations and disorders in Manila and other big cities similar to those seen recently in Davao.

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